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IL INTRODUCTION
Dispute resolution systems historically have included three primary fo-
rums: the judicial process, administrative procedures, and the arbitral system.
This article focuses on the modem and rapidly expanding third system - that
of arbitration. For many disputes, arbitration may be the exclusive way parties
have chosen to seek final relief. For other disputes, arbitration may be a
choice parties can select to resolve their differences.
Our society is witnessing, at the dawn of a new millennium, the evolu-
tion of an arbitration system that is the preferred way used to resolve various
types of disputes and that is gradually replacing litigation as the primary dis-
pute resolution process. This change signals a new and significant approach
in how parties are and will be resolving disputes. For some, this useful and
effective change is a welcome relief from the excessive costs, wasted time,
and painful process fostered by lawsuits. For others, this suspicious and ques-
tionable change is an unwelcome diversion from our common law, jury based
trial system. Friends and foes of arbitration have one thing in common: they
understand and realize that arbitration has been readily accepted by clients
and parties, has been approved by the highest federal and state courts, and
continues to be authorized by federal and state statutes. Like it or not, arbitra-
tion is being used and will continue to be used.
The goal of everyone interested in maintaining a fair, accessible, and af-
fordable civil justice system is to monitor, shape, and maintain arbitration as
a fair, accessible, and affordable system. The purpose of this article is to pro-
vide information and ideas which will help make that goal a success. Our
hope in authoring this article is that our explanations and suggestions will
foster the continuation and further development of a fair civil justice system
accessible and affordable to all.
The first part of this article (Sections Il and MI1) explains the historical
development of arbitration in this country prior to and under the Federal Ar-
bitration Act (the FAA) and continuing through to the present day. This legal
history is primarily a review of significant United States Supreme Court deci-
sions that have interpreted and applied the FAA. This legal development has
established the groundwork and created the framework for enforceable arbi-
tration agreements and awards for virtually all types of disputes involving all
types of parties, including common, domestic disputes between businesses
and customers and complex, complicated multi-billion dollar international
disputes.
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The second part of this article (Section IV) begins with an exploration of
the basic and essential factors that traditionally comprise the American way to
resolve disputes fairly. These factors underlie the judicial, administrative, and
arbitral systems and are indispensable features of any fair dispute resolution
process. This part concludes with an innovative proposal promoting the devel-
opment of a public and private partnership between arbitral associations and
the judicial system to offer and support a fair, accessible, and affordable arbi-
tral/judicial process.
It will be up to the reader to decide whether this partnership proposal is
a good thing. It will be up to all of us to decide how this joint venture pri-
vate/public system, or a variation of it, will be developed and used. It will be
up to history to tell us whether we succeeded.
II. WHERE HAVE WE BEEN?
Arbitration did not always receive the favorable treatment in the United
States it receives today. In fact, while early U.S. merchant communities fa-
vored the use of arbitration as a means to settle disputes, early courts were
hostile to arbitration.' It did not take long, however, for courts to recognize
the practicality and efficiency of arbitration. Once courts realized these attrib-
utes, the use of arbitration developed with lightning speed. A brief summary
of this development follows.
A. History of Pre-1925 U.S. Arbitration
The use of arbitration began in the United States during the colonial pe-
riod.2 According to newspapers, legal records and business records, "arbitra-
tion was in constant and widespread use in New York" between 1664 and
1783.3
1. Merchants' and Industry's Use of Arbitration
Arbitration was used by colonial merchants to avoid the "expensive end-
1. Bruce L. Benson, An Exploration of the Impact of Modem Arbitration Statutes on the
Development of Arbitration in the United States, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 479, 482-83 (1995); STE.
PHEN PATRICK DOYLE & ROGER SILVE HAYDOCK. WrrHOUT THE PUNCHES: RESOLVING DISPUTES
WrrIHouT LMGAnoN 28 (1991).
2. Benson, supra note 1, at 481; DoYLE & HAYDOCK, supra note 1, at 28; Bruce H. Mann,
The Formalization of Informal Law Arbitration Before the American Revolution, 59 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 443, 443 (1984) (noting "[in colonial times arbitration played an important role in resolv-
ing disputes").
3. Benson, supra note 1, at 481.
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less law" dispensed by government courts of that period.' Merchants recog-
nized that arbitration was quicker, less formal, less expensive and more pri-
vate than litigation.5 Moreover, unlike public judges of that time, arbitrators
were "chosen on the basis of their expertise in matters pertinent to specific
disputes."' 6 Practices developed among merchants to enforce arbitration
awards; the failure to comply with an arbitrator's decision resulted in threats
to a merchant's reciprocal arrangements or to his reputation 7 Consequently,
arbitrators' decisions were generally honored and the use of arbitration was
effective.
Eventually, business and trade associations began to use-arbitration on an
institutional basis. The New York Chamber of Commerce, for example, ap-
proved of and provided for the use of arbitration from its inception in 1768.
It appointed its first arbitration committee on June 7, 1768.9 The Chamber
continued to appoint committees regularly until the war in 1775, and it re-
sumed appointing arbitration committees as soon as the war was over.'0 The
New York Stock Exchange also incorporated arbitration into its 1817
constitution.1
2. Common Law Developments
English courts were hostile to arbitration and that hostility carried over,
initially, in the early courts of the United States. The precedent of hostility to
arbitration dates back to 1609 when an English court declared, in Vynior's
Case, 2 that contracts to submit to arbitration were revocable.'3 Even later, as
the common law began to recognize parties' intent as a significant factor in
contract enforcement, arbitration clauses continued to be treated as
4. Id. at 482.
5. Id.; DoYLE & HAYDOC, supra note 1, at 28; see also Mann. supra note 2 at 463 (not-
ing "people who chose arbitration rather than law seemed to believe that arbitration offered ad-
vantages that were unobtainable elsewhere").
6. Benson, supra note 1, at 482.
7. Id. at 484; see also Mann, supra note 2, at 465 (stating people believed -arbitration
awards could ... offer remedies that judgments at law could not").
8. Benson, supra note 1, at 482.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 485. The Exchange continues to use arbitration today.
12. 4 Eng. Rep. 302 (1609).
13. Id.
5
Haydock and Henderson: Arbitration and Judicial Civil Justice: An American Historical Re
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2002
revocable. 14
In the United States, early decisions followed English precedent. In
1803, for example, in Hobart v. Drogan,15 the appellants argued the dispute
was subject to arbitration. The United States Supreme Court responded that
arbitration, "being to a mere amicable tribunal, . . . could not, in a case of
this sort, be now insisted upon to bar the jurisdiction of the court. It is
wholly unlike the case, where a positive law has fixed the mode of ascertain-
ing the compensation."' 6 Thus, "[a] dispute settled by an arbitrator could be
appealed to an American court and essentially be treated. as though it had
never been investigated before."' 17
Nevertheless, as early as 1842, the United States Supreme Court began
to reconsider its position towards arbitration. In Hobson v. McArthur,8 the
Court declared "'in construing [an arbitration] agreement, we must look at
what was the obvious intention of the parties."' 9 Then, in 1854, the Court
made a significant statement in favor of arbitration in Burchell v. Marsh.20
The Court noted:
Arbitrators are judges chosen by the parties to decide the matters submitted to them, fi-
nally and without appeal. As a mode of settling disputes, it should receive every encour-
agement from courts of equity. If the award is within the submission, and contains the
honest decision of the arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing of the parties, a court of eq-
uity will not set it aside for error, either in law or fact. A contrary course would be a sub-
stitution of the judgment of the chancellor in place of the judges chosen by the parties,
and would make an award the commencement, not the end, of litigation.
2
'
The United States Supreme Court developed a positive position toward arbi-
tration at a relatively early point on the historical spectrum.
3. Statutory Developments
By the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, use of arbitra-
tion increased. 22 Litigation issues similar to contemporary problems were al-
ready beginning to plague American courts. Lawsuits were costly; courts
14. See, e.g., Kill v. Hollister, 95 Eng. Rep. 532, 532 (K.B. 1746) (holding contract to ar-
bitrate was attempt by the parties to "oust this court" of its jurisdiction and it was therefore
unenforceable).
15. 35 U.S. 108 (1836).
16. Id. at 119.
17. Benson, supra note 1, at 484.
18. 41 U.S. 182 (1842).
19. Id. at 192-93.
20. 58 U.S. 344 (1854).
21. Id at 349-50.
22. DOYLE & HAYDOCK, supra note I, at 28.
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were congested; and trials were subject to long delays.23 Business people fa-
vored the use of arbitration for resolution of commercial disputes.24 Moreover,
most lawyers found themselves excluded from the increasingly popular pri-
vate dispute resolution methods developing among merchants.? As a result,
some attorneys recognized that the establishment of arbitration statutes would
be beneficial to promote the use of attomeys in the process.? And according
to the American Arbitration Association, arbitration legislation had already
become "a prime objective for the business community in meeting its dispute
resolution needs.""7
New York passed the first modem arbitration statute in 1920 The New
York statute was co-sponsored by the New York Chamber of Commerce and
the New York State Bar Association.? "The statute was unique in providing
for enforcement of agreements to arbitrate future disputes, as well as agree-
ments to settle existing disputes." 30
In 1922, business leaders established the Arbitration Society of America
to educate the public about the benefits of arbitration and to lobby for more
extensive arbitration legislation.3' The Arbitration Foundation, a second arbi-
23. Benson, supra note 1, at 489.
24. DOYLE & HAYDOCK. supra note I, at 28.
25. Benson, supra note 1, at 491; see also DoYLE & HAYDOCK. supra note 1, at 28 (noting
factors that contributed to the increased use of arbitration during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries).
26. Benson, supra note 1. at 491-92. According to Beason:
[A] St. Louis attorney argued before the [1914] meeting of the Missouri Bar Association
that some private disputes should be diverted to arbitration, where a lawyer chosen by the
disputants would serve as the arbitrator. To make his proposal attractive to the member-
ship, he also emphasized that it would increase respect for the judiciary because court de-
lay should diminish, and given that only attorneys with "character and learning" would
serve as arbitrators, "suspicion and reproach" of the bar would also recede. Therefore, by
publicly supporting arbitration by lawyers as an alternative to the courts, the bar could
claim that it was actively pursuing the "public interest."
ld at 493-94.
27. American Arbitration Association, Hisbory of Public Service - Part L Background at
httpJ/www.adr.orglhistory/990907aa.html (last visited March 2, 2001) [hereinafter History of Pub-
lic Service].
28. N.Y.C.P.L.R. §§ 7501-7514 (McKinney 2000) (originally enacted as Act of Apr. 19,
1920, ch. 275, 1920 N.Y. Laws 803).
29. History of Public Service, supra note 27.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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tration organization, was established in 1924.32 The Arbitration Foundation,
however, focused more on research and promoting the "commercial interests
of its constituents. ' 33 Then, in 1925, thanks in large part to the lobbying ef-
forts of the Arbitration Society of America, 34 Congress passed the Federal Ar-
bitration Act ("FAA"). 35
With the implementation of federal arbitration legislation, the Society
and the Foundation worked to integrate their differing approaches, recogniz-
ing that they were both seeking the same gbals.36 "In 1926, with the help of
a mediator, a negotiated settlement was reached resulting in the merger of the
two pioneering groups into a single entity: [The] Amercian Arbitration Asso-
ciation." 37 "Not surprisingly, the AAA openly encourage[d] lawyer participa-
tion at all steps of the arbitration procedure, from the drafting of arbitration
clauses and contracts to the hearing itself."' 38 Also not surprisingly, "lawyer
representation before the AAA arbitration tribunals .. . rose from 36 per-
cent in 1927 to ... 91 percent in 1947."
39
B. Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 ("FAA")
The general provisions of the FAA are set forth in Sections 1 through
16.40 Section 2 of the FAA provides that written agreements to arbitrate mat-
ters involving commerce 4l or maritime transactions 42 "shall be valid, irrevoca-
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. d
35. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, 201-208, 301-307 (West 2001)(originally enacted as Act of Feb. 12,
1925, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883. According to the AAA, Title 9, U.S. Code, Section 1-14, was first
enacted February 12, 1925 (43 Stat. 883), codified July 30, 1947 (61 Stat. 669), and amended
September 3, 1954 (68 Stat. 1233). Chapter 2 was added July 31, 1970 (84 Stat. 692), two new
Sections were passed by the Congress in October of 1988 and renumbered on December 1, 1990
(PLS 669 and 702); Chapter 3 was added on August 15, 1990 (PL 101-369); and Section 10 was
amended on November 15. American Arbitration Association, The Federal Arbitration Act, at
http:// www.adr.org/statutes/federal_act.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2001). An extensive discussion
of the legislative history of the American Arbitration Act is set forth in IAN R. MACNIL AMEiu.
CAN ARBrrRATnON LAW 83-122 (1992).
36. History of Public Service, supra note 27.
37. Id.
38. Benson, supra note 1, at 496 (quoting SvEvEN LAzARus ET AL. RESOLVINO BusINESS
DiPstrrE: THE POTEhNAL FOR CoMMERcIAL ARDrrRATION 92 (1965); see also Mann, supra note
2, at 445 ("In time, the legal system appropriate arbitration to itself and turned it into a formal
process that differed little from legal adjudication.").
39. Benson, supra note 1, at 496.
40. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (West 2001).
41. The FAA defines "commerce" as:
commerce among the several States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the
8
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ble, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract." 43 Moreover, "[i]n enacting the FAA, Con-
gress specifically stated its intent to place arbitration agreements on par with
other contracts and to help parties avoid the expense and delay of
litigation.""
Under Section 3 of the FAA, if a court finds the parties have a written
agreement to arbitrate a dispute, the court may issue a stay on litigation of
the dispute.45 Section 4 goes even further in allowing a court to compel the
parties to arbitrate a dispute upon the refusal of a party to an arbitration
agreement to submit to arbitration. 46 The FAA also ensures that arbitration
awards are enforceable and confirmable to a civil judgment and limits to spe-
cific circumstances when an award may be appealed, vacated or modified!a
While the provisions of the FAA have remained essentially unchanged
since the FAA's enactment in 1925,4 the application of the FAA has been
dramatically expanded. From "arguably no more than a remedy applied to ar-
bitration cases . . . the FAA [has become] definitively established as a sub-
stantive federal law, preemptive and binding on the states, and articulating a
federal policy extending to issues well beyond its literal terms.' 49
In the years after passage of the Federal Arbitration Act, "arbitration
was in vogue." ' ° Nevertheless, "[flor years courts and commentators agreed
that the statute applied only in the federal courts and so governed only the
United States or in the District of Columbia, or between any such Territory and another.
or between any such Territory and any State or foreign nation, or between the District of
Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign nation, but nothing h-rein contained shall
apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.
9 U.S.C. at § I (emphasis added).
42. The FAA defines a "maritime transaction" as charter parties, bills of lading of water
carriers, agreements relating to wharfage, supplies furnished vessels or repairs to vessels, colli-
sions, or any other matters in foreign commerce which, if the subject of controversy, would be
embraced within admiralty jurisdiction. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
43. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
44. Ed Anderson & Roger Haydock, History of Arbitration as an Alternative to US. Liti-
gation, Aug. 12, 1996 WEsTs LEGAL NEws 8257, available at 1996 WL 449743.
45. 9 U.S.C. § 3.
46. 9 U.S.C. § 4.
47. 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-13, 16.
48. DoYLE & HAYDocK, supra note 1, at 29.
49. Hirshman, supra note 49, at 1352-53.
50. Id at 1305.
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few contract suits that happened to involve diversity or admiralty jurisdic-
tion."'5' During these first twenty-five years of the FAA, arbitration was used
to resolve a broad range of disputes privately by the parties. There was little
intervention by the courts in arbitration cases. Beginning in the 1950s, a
United States Supreme Court decision created an obstacle to the expansion of
arbitration that would stand for many years.
C. United States Supreme Court Development - 1950s through the
1990s
1. Off The Rails - Wilko v. Swan52
Treatment of the Federal Arbitration Act by the U.S. Supreme Court got
off on the wrong track with the 1953 decision Wilko v. Swan. In Wilko, the
Court examined an agreement between a securities broker and a buyer
whereby the parties had agreed to arbitrate controversies arising out of the
transaction. The buyer later sued for misrepresentation. The broker brought a
motion to stay the lawsuit, pending arbitration. The buyer sought to continue
with his suit in federal court arguing that the arbitration clause in the parties'
agreement was an unenforceable waiver of his right to bring suit in court
under section 14 of the Securities Act.53
The Supreme Court bought the buyer's argument, holding the Securities
Act conferred on the buyer a right to sue that could not be waived 5 The
Court found the arbitration clause was, therefore, an illegal waiver.55 Despite
the Court's holding, it was the Court's reasoning that caused the real damage
to the Federal Arbitration Act. According to the Court:
[E]ffectiveness in application [of Securities Act provisions advantageous to the buyer are]
lessened in arbitration as compared to judicial proceedings. Determination of the quality
of a commodity or the amount of money due under a contract is not the type of issue
here involved. This case requires subjective findings on the purpose and knowledge of an
alleged violator of the Act. They must be not only determined but applied by the arbitra-
tors without judicial instruction on the law. As their award may be made without explana-
tion of their reasons and without a complete record of their proceedings, the arbitrators'
conception of the legal meaning of such statutory requirements as "burden of proof,"
reasonable care" or "material fact" cannot be examined. [Moreover], power to vacate
51. Id.
52. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
53. At that time, section 14 read as follows: "Any condition, stipulation or provision bind-
ing any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter
or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void." Wilko, 346 U.S. at 430 n.6.
54. Id at 435.
55. Id.
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an award is limited.56
Thus, the Court believed arbitrators would not be sufficiently competent to
determine whether the broker had violated the Securities Act by misrepresent-
ing some aspect of the transaction. The Court's negative attitude towards the
enforcement of legal rights in arbitration, as expressed in lWilko, took a long
time to change, evolving gradually over a period of thirty years.
2. The "Steelworkers Trilogy"57 of 1960
Seven years after Wilko, the Supreme Court issued a group of three opin-
ions known as the "Steelworkers Trilogy." These three cases became the
framework for the development of federal common law governing labor
agreements.
a. United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co.
The first case in the trilogy dealt with the question of when an issue
must be submitted to arbitration. In United Steel Workers v. American Manu-
facturing Co., the Court reviewed the role of the judiciary in the context of
collective bargaining and the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). As
a result, a court's sole function was "confined to ascertaining whether the
party seeking arbitration [was] making a claim which on its face [was] gov-
erned by the contract."58 Because the contract at issue provided for arbitration
of all claims "arising between the parties as to the meaning, interpretation
and application of the provisions of [the] agreement,5 9 the Court rejected the
company's argument that the employee's claims were frivolous and therefore
not arbitrable. According to the Court:
The collective agreement requires arbitration of claims that courts might be unwilling to
entertain. In the context of the plant or industry, the grievance may assume proportions of
which judges are ignorant. Yet, the agreement is to submit all grievances to arbitration,
not merely those that a court may deem to be meritorious ....
The courts, therefore, have no business weighing the merits of the grievance considering
whether there is equity in a particular claim, or determining whether there is particular
language in the written instrument which will support the claim.0
56. d at 435-436 (footnotes omitted).
57. As referred to by Hirshman, supra note 49, at 1306 n.9.
58. United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960).
59. lId at 565 n.l.
11
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While this opinion seems to depart substantially from Wilko, and indeed
it is the beginning of the erosion of the holding in Wilko, the Court seemed to
justify its departure from Wilko based in part on the language of the LMRA.
At that time, the LMRA provided that "final adjustment by a method agreed
upon by the parties is hereby declared to be the desirable method for settle-
ment of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an
existing collective bargaining agreement." 6' Thus, the statute at issue in this
case contained language lending itself to the enforceability of arbitration
agreements whereas, at least in the Court's Wilko opinion, the Securities Act
did not.
b. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.
In this second case of the Steelworkers Trilogy, the Court once again en-
forced an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement. This time,
the Court specifically distinguished Wilko as "irrelevant" to the case at bar.62
The Court noted the LMRA provided for enforcement of arbitration provi-
sions in collective bargaining agreements: 63
In the commercial case, arbitration is the substitute for litigation. Here, [in the labor rela-
tions context], arbitration is the substitute for industrial strife. Since arbitration of labor
disputes has quite different functions from arbitration under an ordinary commercial
agreement, the hostility evinced by courts toward arbitration of commercial agreements
has no place here. For arbitration of labor disputes under collective bargaining agreements
is part and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself.6
The Court apparently believed arbitration was more appropriate in the labor
relations context than in the commercial realm.
The clause at issue in the collective bargaining agreement purportedly
exempted from arbitration "matters which are strictly a function of manage-
ment." 65 The district and appellate courts held the activity at issue - the
contracting out of work by the employer - qualified as a function of man-
agement. The employer's actions were therefore exempt from the mandatory
arbitration provisions. 66
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding activities qualifying as "strictly a
function of a management," must be those activities specifically defined in
60. Id. at 567-68 (footnotes omitted).
61. Id. at 566.
62. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
63. Id. at 577-78.
64. Id. at 578.
65. Id. at 576.
66. Id. at 577.
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the collective bargaining agreement to grant management "complete control
and unfettered discretion." 67 Because the collective bargaining agreement did
not grant management complete control and discretion over the contracting
out of work, the Court held the dispute was arbitrable.6 In so holding, the
Court noted judicial inquiry under the LMRA "must be strictly confined to
the question whether the reluctant party did agree to arbitrate the grievance or
did agree to give the arbitrator power to make the award he made."69 A court
should not review the merits of a dispute and "doubts should be resolved in
favor of [arbitration]." 70
c. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.
The third case in the Steelworkers Trilogy dealt with enforcement of an
arbitrator's award. The lower court had reversed the arbitrator's award, find-
ing the award failed to meet requirements under the collective bargaining
agreement, and further finding the collective bargaining agreement had ex-
pired and the award was therefore unenforceable. The Supreme Court rejected
this reasoning because "the federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbi-
tration would be undermined if courts had the final say on the merits of the
awards."'71 While recognizing that an arbitrator's authority "is confined to in-
terpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement," the Court
nevertheless recognized that courts must defer to the decision of an arbitrator
who does not exceed that authority.72
Establishing a rule that is still in force today, the Court held a labor/
management agreement award is legitimate (i.e., not subject to judicial re-
view) as long as "it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agree-
ment." 73 Thus, while the Court in this case found the arbitrator's opinion and
award ambiguous "ambiguity in the opinion accompanying the award, which
permits the inference that the arbitrator may have exceeded his authority, is
not reason for refusing to enforce the award." 74 The Court concluded its
67. Id at 584.
68. Warrior, 363 U.S. at 585.
69. Id. at 582.
70. Id at 582-83.
71. United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp.. 363 U.S. 593, 595-96 (1960).
72. Id.
73. Id at 597.
74. Id. at 598 (emphasis added).
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opinion with this strong statement: "So far as the arbitrator's decision con-
cerns construction of the contract, the courts have no business overruling him
because their interpretation of the contract is different from his."
75
With the conclusion of Steelworkers Trilogy, the enforceability of con-
tracts to arbitrate and arbitration awards became firmly established in the area
of labor relations.
3. Narrowing'Wilko - 1974
a. Scherk v. Alberto Culver Co.
After the Steelworkers Trilogy, arbitration in labor relations gained a
stronger foothold. However, arbitration of commercial disputes, in particular
commercial disputes involving claims under the Securities Act, were still sub-
ject to the limitations of Wilko. The next major swipe at Wilko came with the
Scherk decision in 1974.
In Scherk, a U.S. citizen purchased three enterprises from a German citi-
zen.76 The German citizen warrantied in the sales contract that the trademarks
associated with the three enterprises were unencumbered. 77 When the U.S. cit-
izen later discovered the trademarks were encumbered, he sued in U.S. fed-
eral court.78 The German citizen, on the other hand, sought to compel arbitra-
tion based on the arbitration clause in the contract. 79 Had the plaintiff alleged
only breach of contract claims, this case might have gone straight to arbitra-
tion. However, the plaintiff (probably with the intent to avoid arbitration) al-
leged claims under the Securities Act.80 He claimed the false statements in the
sales contract were fraudulent representations violating section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act. Thus, the district court and the court of appeals re-
lied on Wilko to hold the arbitration clause unenforceable.8 ' The Supreme
Court reversed.
First, the Supreme Court noted that Wilko dealt with claims under sec-
tion 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, while this suit alleged claims under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.82 The Court noted the remedies pro-
75. Id. at 599.
76. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 508 (1974).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 509.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 509-10.
81. Id.
82. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 510.
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-ided by the different statutory provisions were not the same.D Moreover, the
choice of forum under the 1934 Act was not as broad as what was allowed
under the Securities Act of 1933.8 The Court, however, did not base its deci-
sion on this distinction and instead accepted the premise "that the operative
portions of the language of the 1933 Act relied upon in lirlko are contained
in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934."85
Instead, the Court based its decision on the "significant and, we find,
crucial differences between the agreement involved in Wilko and the one
signed by the parties here."' 6 The Court emphasized that the agreement in
question in this case was "a truly international agreement."87 According to
the Court:
Such a contract involves considerations and policies significantly different from those
found controlling Wiko. In Wiko, quite apart from the arbitration provision, there was no
question but that the laws of the United States generally, and the federal securities laws in
particular, would govern disputes arising out of the stock purchase agreement .... [No]
credible claim could have been entertained that any international conflict of laws
problems would arise. In this case, by contrast, in the absence of the arbitration provision.
considerable uncertainty existed at the time of the agreement, and still exists, concerning
the law applicable to the resolution of disputes arising out of the contract.M
The Court seemed to indicate that in international commercial cases it is per-
missible to "substitute" arbitration for litigation.19
The Court distinguished Wilko, notwithstanding the fact that "the laws of
the state of Illinois were explicitly made applicable by the arbitration agree-
ment." 9 Instead, the Court called the agreement to arbitrate a forum selection
cause (i.e., the parties chose arbitration before the International Chamber of
Commerce instead of opting into the United States litigation system), whereas
the choice of law provision designating Illinois law designated the procedure
to be used in resolving the dispute.91
83. Id. at 513-14.
84. Id. at 514.
85. Id. at 515.
86. It.
87. Id.
88. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 515-16.
89. Warrior, 363 U.S. at 578 ("In the commercial case. arbitration is the substitute for
litigation").
90. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519 n.13.
91. Id. at 519.
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b. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing
Company
Prima Paint involved another commercial arbitration clause. Two corpo-
rations, citizens of different states, entered a consulting agreement that con-
tained an arbitration clause. A year later, one of the parties brought suit in
federal court alleging the other party had induced it to "accelerate the execu-
tion and closing date of the consulting agreement." 92 The defendant brought a
motion to stay the action, pending arbitration. The plaintiff brought a motion
to enjoin arbitration. The district court and the court of appeals held the arbi-
trator, not the court, should determine whether there had been fraud in the in-
ducement of the contract. The Supreme Court affirmed.
The Court justified its decision based, first, on its belief that the consult-
ing agreement "was inextricably tied to [the] interstate transfer and to the
continuing operations of an interstate manufacturing and wholesaling busi-
ness. ' 93 Thus, the Federal Arbitration Act applied.94 Next the Court noted
there was no allegation by the plaintiff that it had been fraudulently induced
to enter into the arbitration clause. 95 Instead, the allegations surrounded the
execution and closing of the contract as a whole.96
The Court held "the statutory language [of the Federal Arbitration Act]
does not permit the federal court to consider claims of fraud in the induce-
ment of the contract generally." 97 Only if the claim were fraud in the induce-
ment of the arbitration clause may a federal court proceed to adjudicate it.98
Thus, the Court held the avoidance of arbitration would not be justified based
on an allegation of fraud in the inducement of a contract simply because it
contained an arbitration clause.99
4. The "Second Trilogy"' 00 - 1983-1985
After Scherk and Prima Paint, arbitration of commercial disputes gained
a firmer foothold in practice and in the federal common law. Nevertheless,
92. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Company, 388 U.S. 395, 398-99 n.2
(1967).
93. Id. at 401.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 406.
96. Id. at 398-99 n.2.
97. Id.
98. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403-04.
99. Id. at 406.
100. Hirshman, supra note 49, at 1353 (discussing three significant arbitration decisions of
the United States Supreme Court between 1983 and 1985 and referring to them as the "Second
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Wilko was not overruled. The Court continued to chip away at Wilko through-
out the 1980's with a Second Trilogy of significant arbitration holdings.
a. Moses H. Cone v. Mercury Constr Corp.
The Moses H. Cone case in 1983 involved a dispute between a North
Carolina Hospital and the Alabama contractor it hired to construct additions
to the hospital building. 0 1 The contract between the hospital and the contrac-
tor appointed the architect to resolve disputes. 102 In the absence of a resolu-
tion by the architect within a specified period of time, the parties were re-
quired to submit disputes to binding arbitration under an arbitration clause in
the contract. 0 3 At one point in the parties' relationship, the hospital refused to
pay certain fees claimed by the contractor?14
Simultaneous with its refusal to pay the fees, the hospital brought a de-
claratory judgment action in state court alleging the contractor had no right to
arbitration. 0 5 The hospital also sought a stay of arbitration.'0 6 The contractor
immediately demanded arbitration and brought a suit in federal court seeking
an order compelling arbitration."'7 But the federal district court granted the
hospital's motion to stay the federal court action, pending resolution of the
state court declaratory judgment action. The contractor appealed the federal
court's orderI °s The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and issued an order
compelling arbitration. The Supreme Court agreed with the Circuit Court,
finding that both the state court and the federal court were required to apply
the federal substantive law of arbitration since the parties' agreement fell
within the scope of the Arbitration Act.' 9
The Supreme Court also agreed that the state court suit and the federal
court suit did not necessarily overlap simply because they both dealt with the
Arbitration Trilogy").
101. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 4 (1983).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 5.
104. Id. at 6.
105. Id. at 7.
106. Id.
107. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 7.
108. Id. at 8.
109. Id. at 24.
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arbitrability of the dispute."10 The state court suit involved the question of
whether a stay should be issued under section 3 of the Federal Arbitration
Act. The federal court suit, on the other hand, involved the question of
whether an order to compel arbitration should be issued under section 4 of
the Federal Arbitration Act. The Court noted:
But in a case such as this, where the party opposing arbitration is the one from whom
payment or performance is sought, a stay of litigation alone is not enough. It leaves the
recalcitrant party free to sit and do nothing -neither to litigate nor to arbitrate. If the state
court stayed litigation pending arbitration but declined to compel the hospital to arbitrate,
[the contractor] would have no sure way to proceed with its claims except to return to
federal court to obtain [an order compelling arbitration] -a pointless and wasteful burden
on the supposedly summary and speedy procedures prescribed by the Arbitration Act."
Thus, even had the state court made a determination that a stay was appropri-
ate, in this case, a stay would not have been adequate to protect the right to
arbitration."12
b. Southland Corp. v. Keating
In the second case in the Second Trilogy, the Supreme Court re-
emphasized the fact that the Federal Arbitration Act is binding substantive
federal law which preempts state law where there is a conflict. Southland
Corp. v. Keating,1 3 involved a consolidated action by 7-11 store franchisees
in California against the owner and franchisor of the 7-11 stores. The fran-
chisees alleged various contract claims and also violations of the disclosure
requirements of the California Franchise Investment Law." 4 Southland, the
franchisor, sought to compel arbitration under the arbitration clauses in the
contracts with its franchisees.
The case worked its way up through the California state court system.
Eventually, the California Supreme Court ruled the franchisees' claims under
the California Franchise Investment Law were not subject to arbitration under
the Federal Arbitration Act, but the contract claims were.tt 5 The Supreme
Court reversed in part, holding that even the claims under the California
Franchise Investment Law were subject to arbitration.
The significance of Southland Corp. is that it established the supremacy
of federal law over arbitration contracts. According to the Court, there are
110. See id. at 21-24.
111. Id. at 27.
112. Id.
113. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
114. Id. at 4.
115. Id. at 5.
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"only two limitations on the enforceability of arbitration provisions governed
by the [FAA]."' 1 6 First, the arbitration provision "must be part of a written
maritime contract or a contract 'evidencing a transaction involving com-
merce.' 117 Second, "such clauses may be revoked upon 'grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.' "11 The Court pointed
out the FAA contained no provision indicating the FAA's "broad principle of
enforceabilty is subject to additional limitations under State law.""n 9
This clear reading of the FAA together with the legislative history of the
statute led the Court to declare California's law preempted by the FAA. 1 '
c. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd
In the third case of the "Second Trilogy," the Supreme Court once again
faced the Wilko issue of whether securities law claims would be governed by
the Federal Arbitration Act.' 2' The plaintiff, an investor, sued his broker in
federal court, alleging violations of both federal securities laws and New
York state securities laws.'2 Once again, the contract between the investor
and the broker contained an arbitration clause purporting to make arbitrable
any dispute related to the contract.ID
One of the reasons the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Byrd was to
resolve a conflict among the federal circuits about how to handle pendant
state securities law claims. Prior to this case, federal courts had used Iilko to
justify their refusal to compel arbitration of pendant state court securities-
related claims. The federal courts reasoned that this "Intertwining Doctrine"
was necessary to avoid overlapping proceedings and collateral estoppel issues
116. Id. at 10-1l.
117. Id, (quoting § 2 of the FAA).
118. Id.
119. Southland Corp.. 465 U.S. at 11.
120. Id. at 16. With respect to the legislative history, the Court noted:
The problems Congress faced were therefore twofold: the old common law hostility to-
ward arbitration, and the failure of state arbitration statutes to mandate enforcement of ar-
bitration agreements. To confine the scope of the [FAA] to arbitrations sought to be en-
forced in federal courts would frustrate what we believe Congress intended to be a broad
enactment appropriate in scope to meet the large problems Congress was addressing.
Id. at 14.
121. See Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
122. Id. at 214.
123. Id. at 215.
19
Haydock and Henderson: Arbitration and Judicial Civil Justice: An American Historical Re
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2002
raised by arbitration awards. 24 In Byrd, the broker brought a motion to com-
pel arbitration of the investor's state law claims, notwithstanding the Inter-
twining Doctrine. The district court and the court of appeals denied the bro-
ker's motion.' 25 The Supreme Court reversed. 2 6
In terminating the Intertwining Doctrine, the Supreme Court determined
that, while it may be more efficient to treat state and federal securities claims
similarly, Congress' primary goal with the Federal Arbitration Act was to en-
sure the enforceability of contracts to arbitrate. 27 Moreover, the Intertwining
Doctrine provided a means whereby parties could avoid arbitration of securi-
ties claims by simply tying state law claims to federal claims. 28 Therefore,
the Court reasoned the Intertwining Doctrine must be eliminated. After Byrd,
securities claims arising under state law may not be sued out where they are
arbitrable under an arbitration agreement. Notwithstanding the holding in
Byrd, Wilko, although weakened, still governed the arbitrability of federal se-
curities laws claims.
5. Wilko Finally Falls
While the Court did not overrule Wilko in Byrd, the writing was on the
wall. The Court obviously no longer believed that arbitrators were incompe-
tent to understand complicated legal claims like securities claims. Neverthe-
less, Wilko was standing in the way of the expansion of arbitration. It had to
go.
a. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.
The issue in Mitsubishi Motors was whether claims arising under U.S.
antitrust laws and "encompassed within a valid arbitration clause in an agree-
ment embodying an international commercial transaction" were arbitrable
under the FAA and the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards ("the Convention"). 29
The dispute arose between a Japanese car manufacturer and one of its
dealers in Puerto Rico. The sales agreement provided for the arbitration of
124. Id. at 216-17. The "doctrine of intertwining" was the approach used by several cir-
cuits to deny arbitration of the arbitrable claims and try all the claims together in fedcral court.
The doctrine was used "when arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims [arose] out of the same transac-
tion, and [were] sufficiently intertwined factually and legally." Id.
125. Id. at 215-16.
126. Id. at 217.
127. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 219.
128. Id. at 219-20.
129. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 616 (1985).
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"all disputes, controversies or differences which may arise. . . out of or in
relation to. . . the Agreement or for the breach thereof."'1 As a result, the
Japanese manufacturer brought an action to compel arbitration. The dealer
counterclaimed with claims under the U.S. antitrust laws. Prior to this case,
courts had followed the Second Circuit's opinion' 3' that, in accordance wvith
Wilko, claims under U.S. antitrust laws were "of a character inappropriate for
enforcement by arbitration."' 32 Nevertheless, the district court ordered arbitra-
tion based on its belief that Scherk required arbitration because of the interna-
tional character of the dispute. 33 The First Circuit Court of appeals reversed,
in part, holding the antitrust claims were not subject to arbitration.' 4
The Supreme Court decided all of the claims - even the antitrust claims
- were arbitrable. In so ruling, the Court emphasized there is nothing in the
FAA implying a "presumption against arbitration of statutory claims."'1 In-
stead, "as with any other contract, the parties' intentions control, but those
intentions are generously construed as to issues of arbitrability."'13 When a
court finds the parties intended to arbitrate a statutory claim, a court should
examine the applicable statute to determine whether Congress intended to
prohibit arbitration. The Court noted:
We must assume that if Congress intended the substantive protection afforded by a given
statute to include protection against waiver of the right to a judicial form that intention
will be deducible from text or legislative history. Having made the bargain to arbitrate.
the party should be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a
waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue. Nothing, in the meantime,
prevents a party from excluding statutory claims from the scope of an agreement to
arbitrate. 37
130. Id. at 617.
131. See American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. McGuire & Co.. 391 F.2d 821 (2nd Cir.
1968).
132. Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 621.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 623.
135. Id at 625.
136. Id. at 626.
137. Id. at 628. Interestingly, the Court cited 11i/ko to support its conclusions, although the
Court acknowledged the outdated hostility towards arbitration expressed in ilko. Id. at 626.27
("we are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the
competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of arbitration as an alternative means
of dispute resolution.").
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The implication is that broad arbitration agreements will, after Mitsubishi
Motors, be deemed to include statutory claims unless those agreements ex-
pressly exclude statutory claims from their scope, or unless Congress has ex-
pressly prohibited arbitration of those claims in the relevant statute or legisla-
tive history. Nevertheless, the Court in this case justified its decision to
compel arbitration based on the holding in Scherk. That is, the international
nature of the dispute compelled enforcement of the arbitration agreement as a
forum selection clause. 38 Thus, once again, Wilko was not overruled.
b. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon
The holding in Wilko took another hit with the release of the Supreme
Court's opinion in Shearson/American Express v. McMahon. 39 Once again,
securities brokers sought to compel arbitration of customers' claims made
under the Securities Exchange Act (SEA). 40 The brokers also sought to arbi-
trate claims filed by the customers under the Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act (RICO).' 41 In holding both the SEA and the RICO
claims arbitrable, the Court reinforced the use of its two-step analysis to de-
termine the arbitrability of disputes. 42
The first analysis performed by the Court was to determine whether the
scope of the arbitration agreement was meant to include the statutory claims
at issue. 43 Since the agreements provided for the arbitration of "any contro-
versy arising out of or relating to" the accounts, transactions or the agree-
ment itself, the claims fell within the scope of the agreement.' 4'
The second, more difficult question was whether Congress intended to
exempt claims under the SEA or RICO from the FAA. The task of finding
the claims exempted was made more difficult by the Court's holding in Wilko
that the Securities Act prohibited arbitration because it voided agreements
138. Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 630:
[W]e conclude that concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign
and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial sys-
tem for predictability in the resolution of disputes require that we enforce the parties'
agreement, even assuming that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic
context.
Id. at 629.
139. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 220 (1987).
140. Id. at 223.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 226 (stating the "duty to enforce arbitration agreements is not diminished when
a party bound by an agreement raises a claim founded on statutory rights").
144. Id. at 223.
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waiving obligations under that statute. The SEA contained a similar prohibi-
tion on "waiver."145
The Court nevertheless held in McMahon that arbitration of claims under
the SEA was permitted and not prohibited by Congress because the "waiver"
only applied to obligations arising under the SEA, and not the jurisdiction of
the federal courts.14 As such, the parties were permitted to agree to adjudi-
cate disputes over SEA obligations in an arbitration proceeding and were not
required to use the federal courts to resolve those disputes.14
But how did the Court get around the holding in Wilko that the analo-
gous waiver provision in the Securities Act did prohibit arbitration? First, the
Court noted the holding in Wilko:
can only be understood in the context of the Court's ensuing discussion explaining why
arbitration was inadequate as a means of enforcing 'the provisions of the Securities Act.
advantageous to the buyer.' The conclusion in Wi/ko was expressly based on the Court's
belief that a judicial forum was needed to protect the substantive legal rights cremed by
the Securities AcLt' 4
At the time Wilko was decided, "the plaintiff's waiver of the 'right to select
the judicial forum' was unenforceable only because arbitration was judged in-
adequate to enforce the statutory" obligations created under the Securities
ACL 149
Next, with Wilko's "context" in mind, the Court launched into a discus-
sion about how much the perception towards arbitration had changed since
1953. The Court acknowledged "it is difficult to reconcile Wilko's mistrust of
the arbitral process with the Court's subsequent decisions involving the Arbi-
145. "Section 29(a) of the Exchange Act declares void 'any condition, stipulation, or pro-
vision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of the Act.'" McMahon. 482
U.S. at 227 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a)).
146. Id. at 228-29. Specifically, the Court stated:
What the anti-waiver provision of § 29(a) forbids is enforcement of agreements to waive
"compliance" with the provisions of the statute. But § 27 [the jurisdiction provision] it-
self does not impose any duty with which persons trading in securities must "comply."
By its terms, § 29(a) only prohibits waiver of the substantive obligations imposed by the
Exchange Act. Because § 27 does not impose any statutory duties, its waiver does not
constitute a waiver of "compliance with any provision" of the Exchange Act under §
29(a).
147. Id
148. Id. at 228 (citing Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435).
149. Id. at 228-29 (citing Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435).
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tration Act."' 150 First, courts generally recognized that arbitrators are compe-
tent to handle complex factual and legal issues without direction or instruc-
tion from the court.' 5' Second, arbitration procedures had been "streamlined"
to the extent that courts no longer fear that arbitration unfairly limits substan-
tive rights of claimants.152 Finally, judicial review of arbitration awards, while
limited, were still sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the law. 3
These were all reasons relied on in Wilko that the Court in McMahon be-
lieved were no longer relevant. In sum, "even if Wilko's assumptions regard-
ing arbitration were valid at the time Wilko was decided, most certainly they
do not hold true today for arbitration pr6cedures subject to the SEC's over-
sight authority."' 54
While McMahon did not expressly overrule Wilko, the stage was now set
for Wilko's demise.
c. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.
Just two years after McMahon, the question inevitably arose whether
agreements to arbitrate claims under the Securities Act would now be permit-
ted. That is, would Wilko hold up against a direct challenge? The case of
Rodriguez de Quijas involved claims by customers against their brokers under
both the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act. 55 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari after the Fifth Circuit decided all claims were arbitra-
ble because decisions subsequent had reduced the Wilko holding to
"obsolescence." 15 6
The Court agreed with the Fifth Circuit that Wilko was, indeed, obsolete.
Finally, after almost forty years, the Court overruled Wilko and set the stage
for the expanded use of arbitration. 57 In overruling Wilko, the Court acknowl-
150. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 231-32.
151. Id. at 229.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 233.
155. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 478-79
(1989).
156. Id. at 479 (citing Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman Bros., Inc., 845 F.2d 1296,
1299 (5th Cir. 1988)).
157. While the Supreme Court agreed Wilko should be overruled, it cautioned the courts of
appeals to leave it to the Court to make that pronouncement. Id. at 484. "We do not suggest that
the Court of Appeals on its own authority should have taken the step of renouncing Wilko. If a
precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in
some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly con-
trols, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions." Id. After this brief
lecture, the Court, in the next sentence states: "We now conclude that Wilko was incorrectly de-
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edged it was "not obviously correct" in its interpretation that the Securities
Act prohibited waiver of a judicial forum.'- Relying on the reasoning in Mc-
Mahon, the Court noted that Wiko's reasoning may have been justified at one
time, given the context in 1953. However, "[tlo the extent that Wilko rested
on suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded
in the substantive law to would-be complainants, it has fallen far out of step
with our current strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this
method of resolving disputes.''59
In addition, "it also would be undesirable for the decisions in Wilko and
McMahon to continue to exist side by side."Iw To leave both decisions intact
would create confusion and inconsistency in precedent. After all, the
"waiver" provision construed in the SEA in McMahon is "in every respect
the same as that in" the Securities ACL161 Thus, the inconsistency between
McMahon and Wilko "is at odds with the principle that the 1933 and 1934
Acts should be construed harmoniously."' 6
6. The Third Trilogy - The 1990s
Wiko was the mountain preventing expansion of the arbitration express-
way. Overruling Wilko left the road wide open for the further development of
arbitration to resolve disputes. As a result, a trilogy of cases in the 1990's
(the Third Trilogy) continued to recognize and enforce a strong "federal pol-
icy favoring arbitration."'1
a. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.
Beginning with Gilmer v. hiterstatelJohnson Lane Corp., 16 the Court be-
gan to clarify some of the unanswered questions left by its previously incon-
sistent arbitration policy. The arbitration clause in Gilmer was contained in a
securities brokers application for registration with the New York Stock Ex-
cided ...." Id.
158. Id. at 480.
159. Rodriquez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 481.
160. ld. at 484.
161. Id. at 482.
162. Id. at 484.
163. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226 (1987).
164. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
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change. 65 When, at the age of 62, the broker was fired, he filed claim with
the EEOC, and then filed suit claiming violations of the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA).'6 The employer argued the ADEA claim was
subject to arbitration, and the Supreme Court agreed.
While it was clear that the scope of the arbitration clause was broad
enough to encompass the ADEA claim, and there was nothing in the text or
legislative history to indicate Congress had intended to exempt ADEA claims
from arbitration, the broker argued there was an inherent conflict between ar-
bitration the purpose of the ADEA which prohibited making those claims
subject to compulsory arbitration. 167 The Court, however, disagreed with this
argument.
First, EEOC's administration of the ADEA would not be hindered, in the
Court's opinion, by the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate ADEA
claims. 6 The employee was not prevented from filing a charge with the
EEOC and the EEOC could still investigate on its own, even in the absence
of a claim by the employee. 69 Moreover, "nothing in the ADEA indicates
that Congress intended that the EEOC be involved in all employment
disputes."17 0
Second, the ADEA does not guarantee a judicial forum' 7' and the proce-
dures available in an arbitration forum are sufficient to provide relief. For ex-
ample, the extent of discovery allowed in an arbitration setting provides an
adequate means for the plaintiff to develop his case. 72 There is no evidence
that an ADEA claim is so much more complicated than other types of claims
that arbitration would be inadequate. 73 In addition, the Court noted that arbi-
trators have the power to grant equitable relief and are required to issue writ-
ten opinions. Thus, the types of relief and review contemplated in the ADEA
165. Id. at 23. The application contained a clause whereby the broker "'agreed to arbitrate
any dispute, claim or controversy' arising between him and [his employer] 'that is required to be
arbitrated under the rules, constitutions or by-laws of the organizations with which I register.'"
Id. A NYSE rule required arbitration of employment disputes. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 26-27. Gilmer conceded that nothing in the text of the ADEA or its legislative
history explicitly precluded arbitration. Id.
168. Id. at 28.
169. Id. at 28-29.
170. Gilner, 500 U.S. at 28.
171. Id. "So long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate his or her statutory
cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and de-
terrent function." Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 614).
172. Id. at 31.
173. Id.
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are still available in an arbitration forum. 174 Finally, the Court rejected that
notion that arbitrators would be biased and noted that the NYSE's arbitration
rules provided protections in the unusual circumstance where a plaintiff be-
lieved bias to be an issue. 75
The Gilmer Court reviewed the major complaints and concerns that had
been voiced by those opposed to arbitration, and that had been raised in the
lower courts. Of all the U.S. Supreme Court arbitration cases, Gilmer is per-
haps the seminal case heralding a new era for arbitration. The Court's deci-
sion in Gilmer closed almost all of the loopholes that had been used to avoid
enforcement of arbitration agreements and made clear that arbitration agree-
ments between businesses and individuals are readily enforceable. The Court's
next opinion closed another loophole with its broad construction of the lan-
guage of the FAA and further expanded the horizons for arbitration
agreements.
b. Allied-Bruce Terninix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson
Since the Court's decision in Southland Corp. v. Keating,116 state arbitra-
tion laws in conflict with the FAA were meant to be preempted by the federal
law. Yet, in the eleven years since that decision, several state courts navigated
around Southland Corp.'" by construing the language of the FAA narrowly,
avoiding conflict and thereby avoiding preemption of the state law. 78 Under
that narrow construction of the FAA, the parties to the contract must have
contemplated a connection between their contract and interstate commerce. 179
But under a broader reading of the FAA, a contract is arbitrable if it involves
interstate commerce in fact. The parties' "contemplations," under the broader
construction, are irrelevant.W°
In light of the FAA's stated purpose to end the hostility towards arbitra-
tion agreements and to put them on the same footing with other contracts, the
174. lId at 31-32.
175. Id. at 30.
176. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
177. The Dobsons, with the support of 20 attorneys general requested in this case that the
Court overrule Southland Corp. The Court refused. Allied-Bruce Terininix Cos. v. Dobson, 513
U.S. at 272.
178. Id. at 269.
179. Id. at 278.
180. Id.
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Court held the broader construction of the statute was the correct construc-
tion.' 8' Before making its determination, the Court closely examined the lan-
guage of the FAA which governs "a contract evidencing a transaction involv-
ing commerce."' 82 First, the Court construed the words "involving
commerce" to mean "affecting commerce." 1 3 This was evidence, in the
Court's eyes, that Congress intended to exercise expansive powers over arbi-
tration contracts. 8 4 Next, the Court construed the language "evidencing a
transaction" such that a contract involving interstate commerce in fact was
sufficient to "evidence a transaction" governed by the FAA. 85
With evidence of congressional intent to extend federal power over con-
tracts affecting interstate commerce, the Court had no trouble finding the
FAA governed this contract between a nationwide termite company and Ala-
bama homeowners. 8 6 Moreover, because the FAA conflicted with the Ala-
bama statute that would have invalidated the arbitration clause, the Alabama
law was preempted by the FAA.'17 The U.S. Supreme had now resolved any
further doubts about the ultimate reach of the FAA in governing arbitration
agreements and signaled a further advancement in the use of arbitration
agreements between businesses and consumers.
c. Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto
Any doubt that remained about the Court's resolve to support the holding
in Southland Corp. was extinguished with the 1996 decision in Doctor's As-
sociates v. Casarotto.18 8 The Court remanded Casarotto for reconsideration af-
ter issuing its opinion in Dobson.8 9 Nevertheless, the Montana Supreme
Court affirmed its previous decision that a Montana statute, which required a
specific type of notice on arbitration contracts, was not preempted by the
FAA.19
181. Id. at 271-73.
182. Id. at 273.
183. Dobson, 513 U.S. at 273.
184. Id. at 273-75.
185. Id at 277-78. "[W]e conclude that the first interpretation ("commerce in fact") is
more faithful to the statute than the second ("contemplation of the parties")." Id.
186. Id. at 281-82. In fact, the parties did not contest the fact that the transaction, "in fact,
involved interstate commerce." Id. at 282.
187. Id. at 269-70.
188. 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
189. 515 U.S. 1129 (1995).
190. Casarono, 517 U.S. at 684. The statute stated, "[nlotice that a contract is subject to
arbitration .. . shall be typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract; and
unless such notice is displayed thereon, the contract may not be subject to arbitration." Id.
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Once again, the Court disagreed with the state court. The argument in
this case was not over the tenuousness of the interstate commerce connection
(as in Dobson), but rather the fact that Montana's statute singled out arbitra-
tion contracts from other contracts. 191 Under the FAA, arbitration contracts
must be placed on the same footing with all other contracts.'9 Thus, Mon-
tana's statute conflicted with the FAA and was preempted.' 93 Another loop-
hole was successfully closed.
IH. WHERE ARE WE Now?
The opinions over the last decade, as indicated by the Third Trilogy,
have only strengthened the enforceability of arbitration contracts under the
FAA. These cases have made clear that arbitration is an acceptable, and per-
haps preferable, way for parties to choose and use to have their disputes re-
solved. The Supreme Court upheld arbitration agreements between businesses
and customers, employers and employees, and corporations and individuals.
The war over the availability and use of arbitration was over, and arbitration
prevailed with the real winners being the parties who select arbitration instead
of litigation to resolve their disputes.
Arbitration contracts of all types of agreements and involving all types
of parties are being readily enforced with the reliability of other contracts. As
a result, arbitration clauses in all types of contracts are becoming more and
more common, but, not without challenges. The attacks have changed in their
focus. The attacks can no longer claim arbitration is disfavored or a bad idea,
or un-American. Federal and state courts have followed the precedent and
lead of the U.S. Supreme Court and recognized that arbitration can be used
by parties to replace lawsuits. The attacks now focus on the procedural details
of the available arbitration process to ensure its fairness to all parties. Two
cases in the last few years present examples of the ways businesses are using
191. Id. at 687 (holding the special notice requirement is generally not applicable to
contracts).
192. Id. "By enacting § 2. we have several times said. Congress precluded States from
singling out arbitration provisions for suspect status, requiring instead that such provisions be
placed 'upon the same footing as other contracts.' "Id.
193. Id. "Montana's [statute] directly conflicts with § 2 of the FAA because the State's
law conditions the enforceability of arbitration agreements on compliance with a special notice
requirement not applicable to contracts generally." It.
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arbitration contracts today, and the Supreme Court's view on whether those
uses are legitimate.
A. The New Millennium - Arbitration Continues to Expand
1. Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph
The case of Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph'94 involved con-
sumer claims under the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA") and the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act ("ECOA"). Previous cases had also dealt with individuals
who were not sophisticated users of litigation or arbitration. The consumer
party in this case agreed to an adhesion contract drafted by a large financial
company. The arbitration agreement challenged by the consumer was con-
tained in her mobile home financing agreement. 95 The consumer alleged that
agreement was, in itself, a violation of her rights under the ECOA because
she could not afford to pursue arbitration and therefore was prohibited from
pursuing her statutory rights under the TILA. 196 Randolph claimed TILA vio-
lations relating to excessive finance charges.' 97
The first issue the Court had to face was whether the district court's or-
der compelling arbitration was a final order and therefore immediately appeal-
able. 98 Section 16 of the FAA contained two provisions that may have gov-
erned this issue. On the one hand, no appeal could be taken from an
interlocutory order compelling arbitration.199 On the other hand, an appeal
could be taken from "a final decision with respect to an arbitration that is
subject to [the FAA]." 200 The Court reasoned that the decision "end[ed] the
litigation on the merits and [left] nothing more the court to do but execute the
194. 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
195. Id. at 83. The agreement provided "that all disputes arising from, or relating to, the
contracts, whether arising under case law or statutory law, would be resolved by binding arbitra-
tion." Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. Randolph "brought the action on behalf of a similarly situated class." id. The trial
court denied Randolph's motion to certify a class. Id Randolph argued to the Supreme Court that
the arbitration agreement was unenforceable on the grounds that it precluded her from bringing
her TILA claims as a class action. Id. at 86, n.7. The Court, however, refused to consider that
argument because it had not been argued before the court of appeals. Id.
198. Randolph, 531 U.S. at 81-82. The district court had compelled arbitration and dis-
missed Randolph's claims, with prejudice. Id. at 82. The Eleventh Circuit held it had jurisdiction
to review the order because that order was a "final decision" appealable under section 16 of the
FAA. Id
199. Id. at 83 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 16(b)(3)).
200. Id.
30
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol2/iss2/1
[Vol. 2: 141, 2002]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLrION LAW JOURNAL
judgment." 20 1 Thus, the Court agreed with the Eleventh Circuit that the order
compelling arbitration and dismissing all claims with prejudice was a "final
decision" and was therefore immediately appealable.0
The second issue considered by the Court was whether the lack of refer-
ence to arbitration costs in the arbitration agreement precluded enforcement of
the agreement. 03 Randolph argued the "risk" of prohibitive arbitration costs
would force her to "forgo" her claims against Green Tree and therefore pre-
clude her from "vindicating her federal statutory rights in the arbitral fo-
rum."$' The Court agreed this was a danger.205 However, Randolph failed to
produce sufficient evidence of the costs she would actually incur in arbitrat-
ing her claims.206 In fact, there was no evidence that she would have incurred
any costs at all.20 Based on this fact, the Court refused to invalidate the arbi-
tration agreement. "The 'risk' that Randolph will be saddled with prohibitive
costs is too speculative to justify the invalidation of an arbitration
agreement."2
Whether or not an arbitration process is so prohibitively expensive, as a
legal and practical matter, may only be readily proven after an arbitration,
and not before. The arbitration agreement itself may require the business to
pay all or most of the arbitration fees. Or the rules of the arbitration adminis-
trator may require the business to pay most of the costs, or allow an indigent
consumer a waiver of fees. Justice Ginsburg, even in dissent, noted that mod-
els of fair fee allocation exist.
All of the Justices in the Greentree Court held that arbitration is a legiti-
mate, acceptable method for businesses and consumers to resolve their differ-
ences. The importance of the Greentree decision extends far beyond what the
Court directl held. Critics of arbitration attacked it as being unfair to parties
to adhesion contracts, to consumers who have to do business with corpora-
201. Id.
202. Randolph, 531 U.S at 83.
203. Id. at 84.
204. Id.
205. 1I
206. The Court re-emphasized the burden is on the party resisting arbitration to prm why
arbitration is not appropriate. Id Randolph produced no information to provide a "sufficient ba-
sis for concluding that [she] would in fact have incurred substantial costs in the eent her claim
went to arbitration." ld at 85 n.6.
207. Id.
208. Randolph, 531 U.S. at 85.
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tions, and to individuals who have a right to a civil jury trial lawsuit, and
these challenges were advanced in the Greentree case. The Supreme Court's
decision in Greentree rejects these attacks and challenges and recognizes that
arbitration is readily enforceable if it is fair, affordable, and accessible.
2. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams
After Randolph, the Court granted certiorari on Circuit City Stores, Inc.
v. Adams2 to determine the scope of the FAA as it applies to contracts for
employment. Specifically, section 1 of the FAA exempts "contracts of em-
ployment of seamen, railroad employees, or other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce. ' 210 Nine of the federal circuit courts of appeal
construed this clause to exempt only employment contracts of transportation
workers; the Ninth Circuit alone held the provision exempted all contracts of
employment from arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act. 21 1 The Su-
preme Court agreed with all the other circuits and disagreed with the Ninth,
and narrowly construed the exemption in section 1 such that only transporta-
tion workers' contracts are exempt. 212
The Court gave two primary reasons for its decision. First, the Court ad-
dressed Adams' argument that, under section 2 of the FAA, an employment
contract was not a "contract evidencing a transaction involving interstate
commerce. ' 213 According to Adams, the word "transaction" extended the
FAA only to commercial contracts and therefore, the FAA did not apply to
employment contracts. 2 4 The Court easily rejected this argument, noting "if
all contracts are beyond the scope of the [FAA] under the section 2 coverage
provision, the separate exemption for 'contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in . . . interstate
commerce' would be pointless. '215
Next, Adams compared the language "engaged in commerce" to the lan-
guage "involving commerce" to argue that Congress intended to exempt all
employment contracts "affecting commerce." '2t6 The Court also rejected this
209. 121 S. Ct. 1302 (2001).
210. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
211. Adams, 121 S. Ct. at 1306.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1308.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1308. Remember that, in Dobson, the Court construed "involving commerce"
to mean "affecting commerce" and that meant Congress intended to exercise its commerce pow-
ers to their fullest extent. See Dobson, 513 U.S. at 273-75. Adams' argument, therefore, was that
Congress intended to exempt all employment contracts "affecting commerce" -i.e., all employ-
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argument, using the maxim ejusdem generi, 217 to restrict the meaning of the
employment contract exemption. According to the Court:
Unlike the "involving commerce" language in § 2. the words "any other class of workers
engaged in... commerce" constitute a residual phrase, following, in the same sentence,
explicit reference to "seamen" and "railroad employees." Construing the residual phrase
to exclude all employment contracts fails to give independent effect to the statute's enu-
meration of the specific categories of workers which precedes it....I
According to the Court, Congress intended the exemption to include employ-
ment contracts of seamen, railroad workers and other transportation workers
who, like seamen and railroad workers, are also "engaged in" commerce.
The Court went on to state that, even without ejusdem generis, "engaged
in" commerce does not, on its face, mean the same thing as "affecting com-
merce" or "involved in commerce." Instead, "the specific phrase 'engaged in
commerce' [is] understood to have a more limited reach." 2t9 Therefore, even
were the phrase not a residual phrase, qualified by the specific references to
seamen and railroad workers, on its face, the phrase does not show congres-
sional intent to exercise the full reach of its power to exempt employment
contracts from the FAA.Y
In Adams, the Court once again construed the FAA such that more con-
tracts, rather than fewer, fall within its scope. Instead of exempting all em-
ployment contracts from the reach of the FAA, the Court's construction of
that Act exempts only the employment contracts of transportation workers.
3. Equal Opportunity Commission v. Waffle House
The Supreme Court in Equal Opportunity Commission v. Waffle House22t
examined whether the Equal Opportunity Commission could seek remedies
against an employer where the employee signed an arbitration agreement with
the employer. The Court decided that "yes" the EEOC could seek injuncdve,
ment contracts.
217. Ejusdem Gene.is is "the statutory cannon that 'where general words follow specific
words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects simi-
lar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.'" Adans, 121 S. CL
at 1308-09.
218. Id. at 1308.
219. Id at 1309.
220. Id.
221. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
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monetary, and other relief against the employer even though the employee
had agreed to arbitrate.22
The employer argued that the EEOC should not be able seek relief
through litigation if the employer and employee had an enforceable agreement
to arbitrate disputes between them. The EEOC, on the other hand, argued it
had the statutory right to seek relief in court despite the existence of a private
arbitration agreement. Circuit decisions were split on this issue.m3 The Fourth
Circuit reached a compromise position and decided the EEOC had the power
to seek injunctive relief in the public interest, but could not seek victim-
specific relief for an employee224
The Supreme Court found the EEOC had clear statutory authority to
seek redress for patterns and practices of employment discrimination and held
it could therefore bring cases in the public interest.225 The Court based its de-
cision on two primary factors. First, the EEOC brings suit in its own name
and has complete mastery of the case; the employee has no independent
cause of action and no control over the case.226 Second, the EEOC was not a
party to the arbitration agreement.m27 For these reasons, the Court determined
that the Federal Arbitration Act did not preclude the EEOC from litigating
these issues; the Court held the EEOC could seek all types of relief in public
interest cases. m
Waffle House is harmonious with previous employment arbitration cases.
Following its precedent in Gilmer and Circuit City,229 the Supreme Court in
Waffle House upheld the enforceability of the arbitration agreement between
the employee and the employer. These decisions allow an employee to seek
private remedies in arbitration if an enforceable arbitration agreement exists,
and still allow the EEOC to choose to litigate, or presumably to join, an arbi-
tration proceeding if the parties agree.
Waffle House did not decide related questions such as whether the EEOC
could proceed with litigation if the employee had arbitrated previously or had
settled an arbitration case.Y The Court clearly stated it was only deciding a
222. 122 S. Ct. 754 (2002).
223. Id. at 765.
224. Id. at 759.
225. Id. at 762.
226. Id. at 765.
227. Waffle House, 122 S. Ct. at 763.
228. Id. at 764.
229. Id. at 765.
230. In February 2002, shortly after Waffle House was decided, the Ninth Circuit invali-
dated the arbitration agreement in Circuit City on grounds that it was unconscionable. Circuit
City v. Adams. 279 E3d 889, 896 (9th Cir. 2002).
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very narrow issue, which may account for the 6 to 3 majority decision.'
Waffle House supports the continued use and expansion of arbitration by
employers. For example, critics of arbitration point out that the use of arbitra-
tion clauses may eliminate the opportunity to seek class-wide relief via a
class action. Now it is clear the EEOC can seek class relief in those situa-
tions where the public interest will be served. Individual employees can read-
ily and effectively seek remedies for their individual claims in arbitration, and
classes of employees can obtain relief through a lawsuit brought by the
EEOC. This bifurcated approach makes for good social and public policies.
B. Arbitration is Here to Stay For Good
It took seventy-five years from the passage of the FAA for the United
States to come to this point where arbitration is clearly favored and contracts
to arbitrate are reliable and enforceable.m Judicial opinions over that time re-
fleet the clear support of Congress, through the Federal Arbitration Act, and
the United States Supreme Court, through all the Justices, of the expanded
use and continued growth of arbitration as an accessible, affordable, and fair
way to resolve disputes and provide civil justice relief for everyone in our so-
ciety. Congress has not amended the FAA in any way which might limit or
discourage the use of arbitration. The enactment of many federal laws provid-
ing parties with statutory causes of action and various forms of relief are al-
lowed to be brought in arbitration. 3 In other ways Congress has encouraged
the use of ADR methods, including arbitration and mediation, instead of liti-
gation to resolve cases.23m
The sixteen Supreme Court decisions explained in this section represent
all the important arbitration cases since 1960. And all of these cases have re-
sulted in opinions which promote, support, or expand the use of arbitration.
Of the twenty-four different Justices who have been members of the Court
over this period of time, all of them - all twenty-four - were members of
231. Waffle House, 122 S. CL at 766. An employee cannot obtain double recovery, so it
would seem that an employee could seek monetary relief in arbitration. However, the Court did
not decide whether the EEOC could seek injunctive relief in court, Ld
232. Id.
233. Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 266 (3d Ci 2000); Stout v. Byrider No. 99-
3854, 2000 WL 1269402 at *7 (6th Cir., Sept. 8, 2000); Bette J. Roth, et al- The Alfernative
Dispute Resolution Guide, §§ 15.1 -15.13 (West Group 1999).
234. Federal Civil Justice Reform Act.
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the majority upholding arbitration in at least one case during their tenure, and
most of them were members of the majority a number of times.235 In general,
they all agreed that arbitration was a reasonable, enforceable method for
many parties to resolve their disputes; in particular, some of them disagreed
with the procedures under review in the particular cases.
Further, three of the more important decisions were decided by clear ma-
jorities: Prima Paint was a 1967, 6 to 3 decision; Southland was a 1984, 6 to
2 decision, with one justice concurring and dissenting in part; Gilmer was a
1991, 7 to 2 decision. 23 Even in the most recent consumer and employees
cases, all the Justices currently on the Court supported the use of arbitration
that was fair, affordable, and accessible.237
We conclude this part of the article with the clear and unmistakable mes-
sage from the legislative and judicial branches that arbitration is, and will be,
a significant part of our civil justice system and is a highly favored way to
resolve disputes. We now begin an analysis of what the past means and our
proposals for what should happen in the future.
IV. WHAT IS A FAIR, AFFORDABLE, AND ACCESSIBLE DisPuTE
RESOLUTION SYSTEM?
Disputes are inevitable, or almost inevitable. Business relationships or
consumer transactions between any two parties have the potential for contro-
versies and disagreements. So many things can go wrong that some inevitably
will, creating a controversy and the need for a fair, affordable, and accessible
civil dispute resolution system.
This is the history of relationships and transactions between businesses,
consumers and corporations, employers and employees, buyers and sellers,
and virtually all other relationships. Our societal and law abiding reaction to
these potential disputes has been and is to develop a resolution system which
resolves these problems.238 Our legal system defines many of the rights and
duties parties have and governs the means used to resolve disputes.
235. Chief Justices Warren, Burger, Rehnquist and Justices Frankfurter, Douglas, Clark,
Harlan, Brennan, Whittaker, Stewart, White, Goldberg, Fortas, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Ste-
vens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
236. Id. at nn.92, 176, and 188.
237. See supra notes 194 and 209.
238. See Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with Administration of Jus-
tice, 29 ARIZ A.B.A. ANN. REP. 395 (1906); Christine Lepera Jeannie Costello, New Areas in
ADR, in Alternative Dispute Resolution: What the Business Lawyer Needs to Know 1999, PLI Li-
TIG. & ADMIN. PRAC. 595 (1999).
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In any effective dispute resolution system, a neutral decision maker must
apply the law to the facts and decide a case on its merits, or, at least, that is
the discernible goal that is to be achieved, unless something goes wrong. Par-
ticipants in such a dispute resolution forums will have faith in, believe in the
system, and accept the results if the process is fair. What are the essential ele-
ments of a fair dispute resolution system?
Centuries have elapsed since we began to craft a useful and acceptable
system. Our predecessors discovered or created basic elements essential to a
fair system. Decades of trial and error and years of failure and success have
refined and developed these characteristics. Whether these elements were dis-
covered or created by us, we have as a community of law abiding members
come to believe that these elements of fairness are essential to the just resolu-
tion of our disputes.239 We think of them as "due process," otherwise known
as a party's bill of procedural rights.2
239. See Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Compensation Law. 99
HARv. L REv. 881 (1986); David L. Gregory, The Internationalization of Employment Dispute
Mediation, 14 N.Y. INT'L L REv. 2, 14 (2001) (stating "due process safeguards must be incorpo-
rated into any viable ADR system such that a fair and equitable forum is provided for both the
employer and employee"); Resolving Employment Disputes: A Practical Guide, in Alternative
Dispute Resolution: What the Business Lawyer Needs to Know 1999, PLI Lma. & Anmtn. PRAC
141 (1999)(stating "'due process safeguards are critical to any employment dispute resolution pro-
gram because they ensure a fair and equitable forum for both employees and employers").
240. Edward C. Anderson. The Forum Consumer Due Process Standar4 PLI CoRP. L &
PRAc. 341 (1999). The National Arbitration Forum has adopted a Consumer Due Process Stan-
dard for dispute resolution. The standards are as follows:
PRINCIPLE 1. FUNDAMENTALLY FAIR PROCESS - All parties to a dispute
resolution process are entitled to fundamental fairness.
PRINCIPLE 2. ACCESS TO INFORMATION - In agreeing to a dispute resolution
process, the parties should have reasonable access to information about the process.
PRINCIPLE 3. COMPETENT AND IMPARTIAL NEUTRALS - In any dispute
resolution process, the Neutrals should be both competent and neutral.
PRINCIPLE 4. INDEPENDENT ADMINISTRATION - The administration of a
dispute resolution process should be independent of all parties.
PRINCIPLE 5. CONTRACTS FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION - An agreement to a
dispute resolution process should conform to the principles of contract which apply to
other agreements.
PRINCIPLE 6. REASONABLE COST - The cost of any dispute resolution process
should be commensurate with the claim.
PRINCIPLE 7. REASONABLE TIME LIMITS - The dispute resolution process
should yield reasonably prompt results.
PRINCIPLE 8. RIGHT TO REPRESENTION - All parties should have the right to
be represented in any dispute resolution process.
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A. What are the "Due Process" Elements?
1. Reasonable Accessibility
Whatever system exists, the disputing parties need to have access to it.24'
Two primary aspects of accessibility are reasonably understandable procedures
and realistic access.u2
First, the dispute system needs to make sense to and be relatively under-
stood by the parties. Two components of this element are understandable
rules and usable procedures. If parties cannot figure out what to do, they are
denied real access. If parties cannot effectively participate in the system, they
are denied real results. Rules need to be composed which reflect the average
level of understanding of the larger community. Procedures need to be devel-
oped that permit participation by those likely to be the participants.
Second, the parties must be able to access the system. They inust be able
to file documents, receive and distribute information, and attend or participate
in a hearing. These activities may be accomplished through traditional deliv-
ery methods such as written papers and postal mail, or through modem meth-
ods such as electronic submissions and e-mail. Parties who want and want to
PRINCIPLE 9. SETTLEMENT & MEDIATION - Resolution of disputes by the
parties is generally the preferable dispute resolution process.
PRINCIPLE 10. HEARINGS - Dispute resolution hearings should be convenient,
efficient, fair, and private.
PRINCIPLE 11. ACCESS TO INFORMATION - The parties to a dispute resolution
process should have access to the information necessary to make a reasonable presentation
to the Neutral.
PRINCIPLE 12. AWARDS AND REMEDIES - The remedies resulting from a dis-
pute resolution process should conform to the law.
The complete Standard, with Comments, is available from the Forum at www.arb-forum.org or
P.O. Box 50191, Minneapolis, MN 55405 Elements of basic fairness in arbitration administration
include: (1) the selection of a neutral arbitrator who knows the law; (2) simple, adequate discov-
ery; (3) cost-sharing; (4) an opportunity for representation; (5) availability of all legal remedies;
(6) a written, reasoned award and opinion; and (7) judicial review of the award. Theodore St.
Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration of Employee Discrimination Claims: Unmitigated Evil or Bless-
ing in Disguise?, 15 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 1, 6 (1998).
241. See How the Public Views The State Courts: A 1999 National Survey. National Con-
ference on Public Trust and Confidence in the Justice System (May 14, 1999) at <http:/l
www.ncsc.dni.us/PTC/results.htm>; Supreme Court of Texas, Office of Cort Administration and
State Board of Texas, Public Trust and Confidence in the courts and the Legal Profession in
Texas Summary Report 6 (1999); Public Loses as Lawyers Block Access to Cheaper Legal Help,
USA TODAY, Feb. 19, 1999, at 14A (according to the American Bar Association, 100 million
Americans are unable to access the courts because of high legal costs).
242. James W. Meeker & John Dombrick, Access to the Civil Courts for Those of Low
and Moderate Means, 66 S. CAL L. REv. 2217, 2281(1993); Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunder-
stood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 631 (1994).
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attend a hearing ought to be able to do so practically and conveniently. Par-
ties should have a choice regarding the type of hearing they prefer as well a
convenient location if they choose a traditional, in-person hearing. The type
and location of a hearing are important enough to warrant their own element
in paragraph nine that follows.
2. Reasonable Affordability
A system has to be affordable, and the degree of affordability needs to
be proportional to the issues. 43 If people cannot afford to enter and use the
system, it is of no use to them.2"4 If only rich folks can have their disputes
resolved, others will not tolerate the process nor respect the results. If indi-
gent parties are precluded from pursuing a reasonable claim, the integrity of
the system suffers. Affordability does not mean free, because a free system
would wreak economic havoc by allowing people to make irrational economic
decisions in seeking to resolve their disputes and in allowing them to impose
involuntary process costs on their adversaries.
There must be a reasonable cost, a cost proportional to what is at
stake.245 This means that small disputes need to cost little and large disputes
can cost more. The real costs will reflect the financial status of the general
society, based on the average income, assets, and wealth 9f the available par-
ticipants relative to the value of the issues. When more is at stake, more
needs to be risked, so that the parties make rational, economic decisions
when they decide to pursue, or not pursue, a claim or defense.
3. Choice of Representation
Parties ought to have a choice regarding who helps, assists, or represents
243. Michael D. Bayles, Principles for Legal Procedure, 5 LAw & Pi.m. 37, 45 (1986); Jay
Folberg, Joshua Rosenberg, Robert Barrett, Use of ADR in California Courts: Findings & Pro-
posals, U.S.F. L REV. 343 (1992).
244. See Roger S. Haydock, Civil Justice and Dispute Resolution in the 71veniy.First Cen-
tury: Mediation and Arbitration Now and For the Future, 27 Wt MnaEL L REv. 745, 751
(2000); National Conference on Public Trust and Confidence in the Justice System How the
Public Views the State Courts: A 1999 National Survey, by the National Center for State Courts,
funded by the Hearst Corporation at <httpJ/www.ncsc.dni.usIPTC/sultsreport.hn>
245. Lewis L Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights. Arbitra-
tion Now 25 (ABA 1999); Roper Starch Worldwide, Legal Dispute Study. September 1999. on
behalf of the Institute for Advanced Dispute Resolution.
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them in the system. 246 Parties should reasonably be able to represent them-
selves, depending upon the nature of the dispute; and parties should be able
to decide to have someone help them, when necessary or when preferred.
Traditionally, lawyers have played the role of professional advocate on behalf
of clients, while others have also assisted parties.247 No one profession or oc-
cupation ought to have a monopoly on representation. 24 Those who make
themselves available to represent others need to have the knowledge and
skills to be able to be an effective representer.
The abilities of a representer may vary with the simplicity or complexity
of the dispute resolution system. Some cases will require a highly trained and
skilled professional to represent parties. Other cases may permit the parties to
effectively represent themselves. Rules should allow parties the choice of rep-
resenting themselves or having someone help them, including a lawyer.249 In-
formed parties should have the option to select help based on the abilities of
the available representers, the type of case they have, the forum and tribunal
procdures, and their right to knowingly choose whom they want to help them.
4. Exchange of Differences
When the dispute ripens, one or both parties may want or need a resolu-
tion. One party may want it more than other, or the other party may prefer to
avoid a resolution. The system requires a complaining party to clearly notify
the other party about the dispute. In other words, the complaining party is re-
quired to explain the dispute by disclosing who the other party or parties are,
what is being complained about, and what relief is sought. Correspondingly,
the defending party needs to disclose to the complaining party its defense and
why it is not responsible, and whether it seeks something from the com-
246. Robert E. Meade, Commercial Dispute Resolution Procedures, PLI CORP. L. & PRAC.
65 (1999); Nicole Buonocore, Resurrecting A Dead Horse-Arbitrator Certification as a Means
to Achieve Diversity, U. DEr. MERcY L. REv. 483 (1999).
247. Stafford Henderson Byers, Delivering Indigents' Right to Counsel While Respecting
Lawyers' Right to Their Profession: A System "Between a Rock and a Hard Place", ST. JOHN'S
J. OF L. COMM., 491 (1999); Howard A. Matalon, The Civil Indigent's Last Chance for Meaning-
ful Access to the Federal Courts: The Inherent Power to Mandate Pro Bono Publico, B.U. L
REv. 545 (1991).
248. See Michael Pryles, Assessing Dispute Resolution Procedures, AM. REv. OF Ir'L ARD.
75 (1996); Jill Schachner Chanen, Pumping up Small Claims: Reformers Seek $20K Court Limits
-with No Lawyers, A.B.A. J.. Dec. 1998, 18.
249. Marcus J. Lock, Increasing Access to Justice: Erpanding the Role of Nonlawyers in
the Delivery of Legal Services to Low-Income Coloradans, U. COLO. L. REv. 459 (2001); Gillian
K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market For Lawyers Distorts the Justice System, MIcH.
L. REv., 953 (2000).
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plaining party. These exchanges are known as claims, responses, and counter-
claims. It is not possible for a party to defend a case unless they know what
it is they are defending against. It is not realistic for a party to pursue a claim
unless they know if the other side is right or wrong.
These exchanges are typically served on one another by a method of no-
tice that assures that each party receives the documents. The type of required
service depends upon the nature of the dispute. A case should not proceed
unless it is clear that both parties know what is happening when.
5. Opportunity to Disclose and Discover Factual Information
before a Hearing
There are several levels and types of factual information a party may
want to or need to know before he hearing. The previous element subsection
discussed the element of knowing each other's claim or defense, which is
contained and exchanged in claim and response documents. Other bits of in-
formation in possession of the other side are: (a) helpful factual information
(b) negative factual information, and (c) information the contents of which is
unknown to the requesting party.
As to helpful information, it can be quite useful for a party to disgorge
helpful information from the other party. Getting this information before a
hearing helps prepare for the hearing, may encourage settlement, and avoids
time being wasted at the hearing. And so, this type of essential information
ought to be sought and available. One party ought to be able to ask to other
party for it and receive it, all before the hearing3251
As to negative information, it also can be very useful for a party to learn
about negative information. Getting this information before the hearing helps
plan a rebuttal, avoids a surprise, and can provide the decision maker with a
reasonable explanation, diluting the negative nature of the information.
250. Steven A. Weiss, ADR: A Litigator's Prospective, Bus. L TODAY 33 (1999). Advan-
tages to ADR include developing a specific plan regarding discovery and procedures. The parties
can agree to specific discovery and timelines, exchanges of witness lists and exlubits, and other
aspects of arbitration. While courts will sometimes allow the parties to comment on procedural
issues, parties usually do not reach such agreements in traditional litigation, and some judges will
not allow intrusion into what the judge feels is the court's prerogative. Id.
251. See ROGER S. HAYDocr. DAVID F. HER. & JEFam W. SnaUVa, FtmtDxMETrAs oF
PRETRAL LmAmnoN, ch. 1 (1999); James R. Holbrook and Laura M. Gray, Court.Annred Alter-
native Dispute Resolution, J. Cormr'p. L 18 (1995).
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Whether this information ought to be disclosed is usually not critical. A party
is very likely to know about it, and even if they do not, they can usually rea-
sonably respond to it during the hearing. However, a party can ask for it
before a hearing and may be able to receive it.
As to the unknown, this x-file information is usually not obtainable. If it
is neither helpful nor harmful factual information, then it may be of little
consequence. If the information relates to legal matters, or privileged matters,
or strategies and tactics, then it ought not to be disclosed.
6. Neutral, Impartial, and Knowledgeable Decision Maker
It is an elementary element of fairness that the person who is to decide
the merits of a case should not have any conflicts of interest nor actual biases
and prejudices against a party.252 Otherwise, the decision may be unduly influ-
enced by factors other than the facts and law. A system that dos not require
the decision maker to be fair and impartial cannot produce respectable and
enforceable decisions. 253
A dispute resolution system typically has two divisions of work: one is
clerical, and the other is decisional. Administrative clerks routinely have con-
tacts with parties, demand and accepts fee payments from them, listen to their
administrative complaints, allow ex parte questions, answer their procedural
questions, and may develop an appropriate working relationship with them,
especially if they have a lot of disputes. Decision makers - including judges
and arbitrators - develop a different and more distant relationship with the
parties, and necessarily so. Parties need only to be able to contact decision
makers when the decision maker needs to obtain information from them, and
then not on an ex parte basis. Parties to a dispute are not customers or clients
of any administrator or decision maker; rather they are users of a dispute res-
olution system and must be treated the same under the rules.
This element requiring neutral, impartial decision makers can be en-
forced by allowing a party to challenge a decision maker for cause, that is by
offering facts which show that the decision has some actual bias or prejudice
and is not impartial. 25 A neutral who is disqualified can be replaced by
someone who is qualified. Mere allegations or general assertions of partiality
252. David L. Gregory, The Internationalization of Employment Dispute Mediation, 14
N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 2, 15 (2001); Adam Furlan Gislason, Demystifying ADR Nuetral Regulation in
Minnesota, 83 MrrN. L. REv. 1839 (1999).
253. See Robert Donald Fischer & Roger S. Haydock, 21 WM. MrrcHELL L. REV. 941, 964
(1996); Holbrook & Gray, supra note 251, at 9-10.
254. See 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1994)(defining the procedure of the court upon failure of the arbi-
trator selection process). See also Weiss, supra note 250, at 32.
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or bias is ordinarily not enough to disqualify a decision maker,2." otherwise a
party who wants to avoid the hearing or who is otherwise recalcitrant could
unduly delay the process and unfairly increase costs for all.25 The integrity of
the decision needs to be balanced with the realities of having neutral, inde-
pendent decision makers appointed. Parties are not practically able to select
their decision maker;, rather, they are entitled to a neutral, independent deci-
sion maker.
The third component of this element relates to the knowledge of the neu-
tral. Parties want and need a wise decision maker, wise about the applicable
law, knowledgeable about the procedures, and experienced in making difficult
decisions.3 These qualities make it unnecessary for a party to have to edu-
cate a decision maker, except about the facts. A decision maker needs to base
a decision on the merits of the case. It is the responsibility of the parties to
introduce relevant and reliable facts. It is the responsibilities of the neutral to
listen to the facts, screen them for relevancy and reliability, determine credi-
bility, conduct he hearing, understand the procedures and the rules, know and
apply the law, and reach a decision. This person needs to be quite knowl-
edgeable, and often is a lawyer trained and experienced in these
responsibilities.
7. Opportunity to Prepare for Hearing
This element includes sufficient time to prepare for the hearing and
255. The following courts have rejected the notion that parties can avoid arbitration by
making allegations of bias prior to the arbitration taking place: Gilmer 500 U.S. at 30-32 (1991);
Alter v. Englander, 901 F. Supp. 151, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Pompano-Mlndy City Partners Ltd.
v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., 698 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Valdiviezo v. Phelps Dodge. 995
F. Supp. 1060 (D. Ariz. 1997); Copen Associates. Inc. v. Dan River. Inc., 385 N.Y.S.2d 557 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1976).
256. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30. The Gilmer Court stated an alleged 'bias' of the arbitration
administrator will not prevent an arbitration provided an effective selection process is in place.
Id The court went on to hold that anti-bias provisions negated an allegation that the arbitration
administrator would provide biased arbitrators: (1) The parties were informed of the employment
histories of the arbitrators and could make further inquiry into their backgrounds; (2) Each party
was allowed one peremptory challenge and unlimited challenges for cause; (3) The arbitrators
were required to disclose any conflict that would not allow them to render an objective and im-
partial determination; and (4) The Federal Arbitration Act protected against bias by allowing par-
ties to overturn arbitration decisions for evident partiality or corruption. Id.
257. See JAY E. GRENIG. ALTERNATIwE Dispurm R sounoN § I, (1997); David L Gregory,
The Internationalization of Emplo)ment Dispute Mediation, 14 N.Y. IWrr'L L REv. 2. 14 (2001).
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enough advance notice of the time of the hearing.25 These timing components
allow a party to be prepared for the hearing. Insufficient notice and time de-
nies parties this opportunity. Similarly, a hearing scheduled too far in the fu-
ture diminishes the memories of the parties and witnesses. A timely, prompt
hearing, with adequate notice, satisfies this element. Parties may prefer to de-
lay a hearing while they conduct essential discovery or make an effort to set-
tle a case, on their own or through a mediator.
8. Opportunity to Obtain Procedural Remedies
The parties to the dispute may need the assistance of the decision maker
before the final hearing. Disputes about the rules, procedures, or process may
arise, and the help of a neutral expert is necessary.259 This element is satisfied
if the parties have a reasonable opportunity to request relief or seek an order
from the decision maker regarding these matters. Sufficient reasons need to
exist in support of the relief or order, to avoid a party from unfairly using
these procedures to the disadvantage of the other side. Remedies a party may
need include amendments to claims and responses; the consolidation or sever-
ance of parties, issues, or cases; discovery disputes; the need for a continu-
ance; motions to dismiss for various reasons; and other remedies.
9. Reasonably Convenient Hearing Type and Location
A responsive dispute resolution system can have a variety of types of
hearings available for the parties. Today there at least four types of potential
hearings, or combination of hearings: (a) document, (b) telephone, (c) on-line,
and (d) participatory.26° Parties participate in a document hearing by submit-
ting everything they want or need to the decision maker in writing for review
and consideration. Telephone hearings involve the parties presenting evidence
258. Haydock, supra note 250; Michael Pryles, Assessing Dispute Resolution Procedures,
AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 274 (1996).
259. See David F. Herr & Roger S. Haydock, Discovery Practice Introduction, Ch. 3
(2000); Linda S. Mulleniz, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery
Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1393, 1408-1414
(1994); Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice
Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C.L. Rnv. 525, 531-32 (1998); HERR, MorIoN
PRACTIcE. Intro., Ch. 1-2 (2000); Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Mod-
ern Civil Process, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 631, 632-34 (1994).
260. See David L. Gregory, The Internationalization of Employment Dispute Mediation, 14
N.Y. ITr'L L. R-v. 2, 19-20 (2001) (stating the telephone, cyberspace and video conferencing
provide efficient mediums to conduct mediation); National Arbitration Forum Code of Procedure,
Rules 25 and 26, at <www.arb-forum.com>.
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and arguments in a telephone conference call with the decision maker. Parties
participate in an on-line hearing through e-mail and private chat room com-
munications with each other and the decision maker. A participatory hearing
has the parties appearing in person before the arbitrator, similar to a court
trial. The system can allow the parties to choose from among these types of
hearings.261
The location of the participatory hearing needs to be reasonably conve-
nient for the parties. In a business dispute, the businesses have the resources
to appear at a location that has a reasonable connection to the dispute. In a
consumer dispute, the consumer can appear in the community where they live
or work. The exact location depends upon the circumstances of the case and
the reasonableness of the location in light of the circumstances of the parties
involved.
A corollary issue involves the recording of the hearing. A hearing need
not be recorded if the role of the decision maker is to hear and decide the
facts and apply the law to decide the merits of the case. The parties should
have the option of having a hearing recorded if they prefer.
The hearing should be scheduled for a date and time certain, when all
the parties, representatives, witnesses, and other participants are available and
when the decision has set aside the time. The hearing can then start on sched-
ule, without wasting time and resources, and can end on schedule, without
unnecessary delays.
10. Appear and Present Evidence
This element can be satisfied in all of the various types of hearings, and
it must be so. Each party must have an equal opportunity to present its
case3 a The key element is choice: one party may choose a participatory hear-
ing and the other party may choose to appear by telephone. Both sides had
the opportunity to appear in person, but one party prefers to appear by phone.
The opportunity to fully present a case involves a party being able to
subpoena witnesses to the hearing, if needed, and requiring the disclosure and
261. Judicial Arbitration Mediation Services, Rule 17, at <www.jamsadrcom>; Christine
Lepera Jeannie Costello, New Areas in ADR, in Alternative Dispute Resolution: What the Busi-
ness Lawyer Needs to Know 1999, PLI LM,. & Amtt. PRAcCE 602 (1999).
262. RorER S. HAYooctK & JOHN 0. SONSTENG. TIu ADVOCACy BEORE JUDG tmotis.
AND ARnitmAORS, Ch. 2 (1999).
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introduction of documents and exhibits. The opportunity to introduce evidence
involves a party being able to examine supportive, unfavorable, and neutral
witnesses under oath through direct and cross-examinations.
These elements reflect the adversarial nature of the hearing process and
the burden on the parties to present the merits of their case. The decision
maker is not, in this system, an active or activist participant in the introduc-
tion or development of the facts. That is the task of the parties, or their
representatives.
11. Present Law, Explanations, and Argument
Parties should also have the option of presenting information about the
law, an explanation of the circumstances of the case, and any relevant argu-
ment they believe informative to the decision maker. The parties may choose
not to introduce legal explanations by way of argument or memorandum, but
they should have the chance to do so. In a global sense, the parties ought to
have a full and equal opportunity to say what they want to the decision
maker, tempered by the factors of relevance, reasonableness, and time.263
12. Receive an Understandable Award
After the hearing is all over, the decision maker should decide the case
and issue a prompt, understandable award. It can be short as long as it states
who won and lost and what was won or lost. It can include findings of facts,
conclusions of law, or a detailed explanation, if the parties request those de-
tails. The decision maker ought to be bound by the substantive law, and pre-
vented from exercising unbounded discretion. 264 Requiring the decision maker
to follow the law results in more predictable and reasonable decisions. And, a
fair dispute resolution system wants and needs predictable and foreseeable
results.
13. Opportunity to Appeal Award if Wrong or Wrongly Decided
The requirement that the decision maker follow the law readily permits
an appeal or challenge from the decision to a judge or panel of judges who
can review the legal issues de novo and determine if the decision was right or
wrong about the applicable 1aw.265 The factual findings of the decision maker
263. Id. at chapter 3; HAYDocK. supra note 251, Book 4.
264. See Lapine TecL Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 889 (9th Cir. 1997); Gate-
way Tech., Inc. v. MCI Telecomm Corp., 64 E3d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 1995).
265. 9 U.S.C. § 15; Uniform Arbitration Act, § 11 (2000).
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should be upheld unless the determination violates the law because the deci-
sion maker was present to hear the witnesses, determine credibility, accept the
evidence, and interpret the facts, and the appellate panel was not. The appeal
of the legal issues acts as a check on wayward decision makers who may in-
tentionally or negligently fail to follow the law. This review also makes for a
more predictable and reasonable basis for future decisions in similar cases.
The relief an appeal may provide includes affirming, vacating or modifying
the result and remanding the case to the decision maker.
14. Enforcing the Decision
It is critical that the winning party to a decision that has not been chal-
lenged or that is upheld on appeal be able to enforce it.26 A decision that
mandates that the losing party pay the winning party money needs to be en-
forced if the losing party refuses or fails to pay. The winner needs to be able
to go the jurisdiction where the losing party has resources and enforce the de-
cision as a civil judgment. Decisions that are not enforceable after having
been wrought through an entire dispute resolution system renders that system
unworkable and useless.
15. Reasonably Prompt and Responsive Process
This entire process must be reasonably fast. Common disputes ought to
be resolved within a matter of months.m A prompt, responsive system keeps
costs down, processes cases while the facts are still fresh in the memories of
the participants, and results in a process parties prefer. A process that takes
too long deprives many parties of any useful result. In some cases, decisions
may need to be made within weeks to provide the parties with the relief they
need. A procedure needs to be able to provide timely - and perhaps prompt
and immediate final - decisions to meet the individual or business interests
of the parties.
266. Enforcement of any arbitration award requires confirmation of the award by a court.
See 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1994); Daniel D. Demer & Roger S. Haydock. Confirming an Arbitration-
Ai'ard, 23 W. MrRmu-ai L Rv. 879, 881-883 (1997).
267. See Lewis L Maltby, Private Justice: Employmen Arbitration and Civil Rights, ARB.
Now 23 (ABA 1999).
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16. Goal: Fair Process and Result, Win or Lose
The goal of a fair, due process based dispute resolution system is this:
after it is all over, the losing party says, however grudgingly: "It hurts to
lose, but it was a fair hearing, and I'd do it again in the future." A winning
party is likely to be pleased with both the process and the results, or at least
accept them more willingly, or at least complain less. The ultimate objective
is to get the losing party to accept defeat and praise, or at least, recognize the
process and result as fair 2 The elements of the system described in this sec-
tion help achieve that noble purpose.
B. How to Implement a Dispute Resolution System
Is there an existing system that has these essential due process elements?
Is there a procedure that provides for full and fair hearings and just results?
Is there a forum that provides parties with access to justice? Did you think
we would have written this much this far if we did not have an answer for
you? And we anticipate that you already know or surmise the answer: it is an
arbitration system with judicial review.
An arbitral forum has all the basic due process fairness elements to pro-
vide parties with the hearing of their dreams, well, almost. The judicial forum
has the additional power and authority to review arbitral awards, so dreams
and not nightmares come true, and can enforce arbitration awards so winning
parties can pay for their dreams. The reason we thought you might have al-
ready divined this system is that is reflects what currently is available
throughout the world, and maybe in other galaxies. This system has devel-
oped, on its own, sort of, to provide parties and the public with what is
needed to maintain and foster a civil and civilized society.
It appears, in theory, that there are three primary civil dispute resolution
systems available: purely public, more public than private, and more private
than public.269 They are generically labeled: judicial, administrative, and arbi-
tral. Public laws (a mix of constitutional, statutory, and natural laws) have
created the civil judicial system which is largely operated by public figures.
Public laws have also created administrative law proceedings which have re-
lied on or reflected private law proceedings. Both public and private laws
268. RoGER S. HAYDOCK et al., LAWYERING: PRACTICE AND PLANNING 109-23 (1996).
269. Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute
Resolution and Public Civil Justice, UCLA L REv. 949 (2000); Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Glokal-
izing State: A Future-Orientated Perspective on the Public/Private Distinction, Federalism, and
Democracy, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 769, 783 (1998): First Global Research Facility Dedi-
cated to ADR Launched, 54 DIsP. RESOL J. 4 (1999).
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have fashioned the arbitral system, with its mix of private decision makers
regulated by public laws.
Actually, in reality, all three systems share a blend of public and private
proceedings, rules, and law. A comparison of judicial and arbitral systems
supports this notion. The judicial system is commonly thought to be a public
system, with public rules, public decision makers, and public results. Yet,
about 95% of the time, or more, critical stages of judicial cases are not pub-
licly conducted nor resolvedY0 Private law regulates the vast majority of civil
judicial disputes.
Parties do not have to use the judicial system to gain results. They can
and do most frequently resolve disputes by settling the case before any law-
suit is filed. Further, litigants who have invoked the system almost always
choose to not have their dispute resolved by a public judge or jury. The real-
ity is that litigants usually settle their case secretly with the help of their pri-
vate lawyers who primarily represent them. The lawyers broker dispute reso-
lution deals outside the judicial forum, and occasionally inside with the help
of a judge or public mediator who encourages or fosters the settlement. The
parties agree to confidential terms the details of which the public never sees.
The settlement terms and amounts are secret and protected by a confidential-
ity agreement, the public breach of which can void the settlement.
Judges commonly approve these settlements by signing a dismissal order
prepared by the lawyers, and may only get occasionally directly involved in
cases involving minors, injunctive relief, and lots of parties. The settlement
talks occur in private offices or through confidential correspondence. The re-
suits of the settlement are never made public nor reviewed by a judge. A
growing number of these settlements are brokered by private mediators, re-
270. Anne-Therese Bechamps, Sealed Out-Of-Court Settlements: When Does the Public
Have a Right to Know? NoTRE DnmE L REV. 117 (1990); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie.
Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEx. L REV.
77, 77 (1997) (stating that 90 to 95% of filed cases settle); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud,
Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L REV. 1. 2 (1996)
(noting that one study suggests that of all cases filed, only 2.9% go to trial): Marc Galanter. Real
World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L REv. 1093 (1996); Marc Galanter & Min Cahill,
"Most Cases Settle: " Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAm L REv. 1339
(1994); George Lowenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining,
22 J. L STmIEs 135 (1993)(stating that 95% of filed cases settle); Donald G. Gifford & David J.
Nye, Litigation Trends in Florida: Saga of a Growth State. 39 U. FLA. L REv. 829 (1987)(noting
a below two percent trial rate in Florida in 1979-1985).
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tained by the parties when the lawyers are unable to begin or close the
deal.27' This is the reality of the current lawsuit system, used by all parties
and countenanced by the public court system.
The reasons why rational parties choose this method of dispute resolu-
tion rather than going to trial and having a judge or jury decide the case have
been explained in detail elsewhere. 272 Many parties may prefer some control
over their destiny rather than the unpredictability, expense, and time of a jury
trial verdict; other parties may settle judicial cases because they cannot afford
the excessive costs and wasted time resulting from litigation; others much
prefer to avoid the painful litigation and trial process; and still others are in-
fluenced by these and other factors.2 73 For whatever reasons, the idea that the
public judicial system resolves disputes for parties is wrong and the conclu-
sion that public judges and jurors regularly help all or most litigating parties
is inaccurate. 4 Parties with purely or largely private disputes rely on and
help themselves, with the assistance of lawyers.
There are cases where and when the public judicial system actively
works. Judicial cases involving public, constitutional, or societal issues can be
and usually are resolved by a judge or jury. Administrative cases involving
similar issues that transcend individual parties and affect many segments of
community are ideal ways to have these socially significant cases resolved.
Further, the government can and often is the prosecuting party seeking to es-
tablish or vindicate the rights of its federal, state, or local residents. Govern-
mental administrative agencies can initiate these cases and represent the inter-
ests of many. Attorneys general can similarly bring judicial and administrative
proceedings seeking relief for classes of people. This process works very well
in America and is emulated in many other developed countries.
Other problems may interfere with the public justice system being able
271. Stephen Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary System, 44 HAs-
TINGS Li. 1, 4-5 (1992); John Dwight Ingram, Why Aren't More Cases Settled?, 45 S.D. L REV.
94, 95-96 (2000).
272. Richard M. Calkins, Mediation: The Gentler Way, S.D. L. REv. 277 (1996); E. Patrick
McDermott, Survey of 92 Key Companies Using ADR to Settle Employment Disputes, Disp. REs.
J. 8 (1995); Craig A. McEwen & Laura Williams, Legal Policy and Access to Justice Through
Courts and Mediation, OH. ST. 3. Disp. RFSOL 865 (1998).
273. Nancy H. Rogers & Craig A. McEwen, Employing the Law to Increase the Use of
Mediation and to Encourage Direct and Early Negotiations, OH. ST. J. Disp. RESOL 831 (1998);
Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverue, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Set-
tlement, UCLA L. REv. (1996).
274. B. Ostrom & N. Kauder, Examining the Work of State Courts, 1993: A National Per-
spective from the Court Statistics Project, National Center for State Courts 14 (1995) (compre-
hensive studies indicate a jury resolves less than 1.2% of filed civil lawsuits).
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to do what some proponents prefer.27 Public judges have the responsibility to
resolve criminal, juvenile, and family law cases which reflect serious public
issues. The limited resources available for the judiciary require judges to fo-
cus on their more significant duties. Even if they wanted to, they cannot re-
solve those cases largely involving private contract, tort, and property dis-
putes with parties seeking money as compensation. So, either the judicial
system is not really designed to deal with these issues on a regular and con-
tinuing basis or cannot do so. There are other and better ways to resolve
these disputes.
C. A Private and Public Dispute Resolution Partnership
Parties ought to have two primary choices: how their dispute is resolved
and who resolves their dispute. An effective system develops a fee schedule
and rules to provide informed parties with a realistic opportunity to make a
choice. A system that costs a lot of money to participate in, takes way too
long to reach a final decision, requires help from a monopolistic profession,
and may include unpredictable and inadequately knowledgeable. decision mak-
ers, has to be avoided. It can only serve the rich and those that can wait a
long time for results which they can afford to appeal and wait even longer.
The how and the who of dispute resolution should be decided by disput-
ing parties. Some parties will want to settle their cases on their own, and they
will need access to a system so they can threaten to use it if the other party
does not want to voluntarily settle. Other parties will prefer to retain a lawyer
to settle before or after pursuing a claim. Still other parties will want to have
their dispute resolved by a neutral, wise decision maker and do not want to
settle the case. They do not want to compromise but prefer to have an impar-
tial, knowledgeable decision maker decide their case, win or lose. A fair, ac-
cessible, and responsive system needs to provide parties with real, available
choices they can afford to pay for and participate in.
A way to make this systematically happen is to further develop the part-
nership between public and private dispute resolution systems.7 6 This partner-
275. Edward D. Re. The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction ulth the Legal Profession. 68
ST. JoHN's L. REv. 85, 109-10 (1994).
276. Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute
Resolution and Public Civil Justice, UCLA L REV. 949 (2000); Edward J. Costello. Jr, ADR:
irtue or Vice?; Disp. RES. J. 62 (1999).
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ship can and should have the following features, which reflect the essential
due process elements explained previously:
1. Enforceability
The results of a dispute resolution system need to be enforceable so the
winning party can really prevail and the losing party must accept conse-
quences. Presently, a private arbitration award is enforceable by being con-
verted into a civil judgment with the winning party confirming the arbitration
results into a judicial judgment in any court with jurisdiction, and this judg-
ment is the same as and enforceable as a civil judgment directly emanating
from an original judicial actionY 7 The Federal Arbitration Act, the current
Uniform Arbitration Act, and state arbitration acts all provide this proce-
dure.278 This process can continue.
2. Accountability
An effective system holds the arbitrator accountable for the award. The
best way to accomplish this goal is to require that the arbitrator apply and
follow the applicable substantive law in deciding the arbitration case. 279 This
requires the arbitrator, or a member of the arbitration panel, to be lawyer, that
is, someone trained to be able to discern, understand, and apply the applicable
law. This also requires that the award be reviewable or appealable to make
sure that arbitrator has followed the law, and this requires that a judge be
available to review de novo the legal decision reached by the arbitrator.2 °
This can be accomplished when the winning party seeks to confirm the arbi-
tration award into a judicial judgment. The judge could determine that the
award appears to be supported by the law.28' If there is uncertainty, the losing
277. Daniel D. Derer & Roger S. Haydock, Confirming an Arbitraion Award, 23 WM.
MrrcHELL L REV. 879, 881-83 (1997).
278. Enforcement of any arbitration award requires confirmation of the award by a court.
See 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1994); Uniform Arbitration Act § 11.
279. Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model of Arbitration,
TuLANE L. REv., 39 (1999); National Arbitration Forum, A Comparison of Arbitration Rules and
Practices (presented at the 2000 mid-year meeting of the ABA Business Law Section, Jan.
2000), available at <http://www.arb-forum.com> (the Forum's arbitrators are required to apply
applicable substantive law).
280. See Lapine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997); Syncor Int'l
Corp. v. McLeland, 120 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1110 (1998); Gateway
Tech., Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995); Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc. v.
Francis, 872 S.W.2d 484 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); Faherty v. Faherty, 477 A. 2d 1257 (N.J. 1984).
281. See Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1468-69 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (regard-
ing cases of contracts to arbitrate statutory claims, the court stated it had "assumed that arbitra-
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party can seek to vacate or modify the award arguing the arbitrator failed to
follow the law.m The reviewing judge then determines whether the arbitrator
was right or wrong, under the law. In cases where one of the parties believes
the judge may be incorrect, an appeal is available to an appellate court so
that a panel of three judges can determine the proper, applicable legal
decision.
This process replaces the "manifest disregard of justice" standards
courts have used to review arbitrator awards.n3 If the arbitration agreement or
arbitration code of procedure requires the arbitrator to follow the law, arbitra-
tors must comply with is requirement or otherwise exceed their power and
authority. A standard of review for arbitration awards is whether the arbi-
trators has exceeded their power or authority. If they have, the reviewing
judge can correct this error and decide the case on the applicable law. Courts
no longer have to defer to the legal judgment of the arbitrator.
These procedures supply an appellate review to arbitration awards. Some
parties may choose not to have courts review the legal propriety of the arbi-
trator's decision by selecting arbitration rules that do not require an arbitrator
tion awards are subject to judicial review sufficiently rigorous to ensure compliance with statu-
tory law"); Metropolitan Waste Control Comm'n. v. City of Minnetonka. 242 N.W.2d 830 (Minn.
1976).
282. The grounds upon which the court can vacate an award are: (1) Where the award was
procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) Where there was evident partiality or corrup-
tion in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in
refusing to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cuase shown or in refusing to hear evidence per-
tinent and material to the controversy; or of any other behavior by which the rights of any party
have been prejudiced; or (4) Where the arbitrators exceed their powers, or so imperfectly exe-
cuted them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1994). The Uniform Arbitration Act provides for similar restrictions on
vacating awards. Uniform Arbitration Act § 11.
283. The following courts ultimately created the "manifest disregard of the law" standard:
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986). Ad-
vest Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1990); Marshall v. Green Giant Co.. 942 F.2d 539,
550 (8th Cir. 1991) and Montes v. Shearson, Lehtnan Bros., Inc., 128 F3d 1456. 1460 (11th CiM
1997). The FAA also provides remedies for claims of arbitral unfairness. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10, 11
(1994).
284. See U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (empowering the court to act "(w]herc the arbitrators exceeded
their powers.") However, the powers of the arbitrators are defined by the arbitration agreement.
See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989). Furthermore, if arbi-
trators have broad powers, the court's review is limited. See, e.g.. United Paperworkers Int'l
Union AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987).
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to follow the law. Parties who want the security that comes with another level
of enforceability can agree to an appellate system.
3. Accessibility
The public/private partnership needs to be accessible to parties. And it is
and can be readily available. The applicable procedural laws permit parties
and their chosen representatives access to the public courts to review and ap-
prove arbitration awards issued by private arbitrators. This legal framework
forms the basis for the public/private partnership. 285
4.. Affordability
This public/private system retains the advantages of a low cost arbitra-
tion system and a low cost appeal system. The parties can use the arbitration
process to obtain an award and have available the public judicial system for
those cases in which one of the parties believes the expert arbitrator has sig-
nificantly failed to follow the law. These dual forums become much more af-
fordable because of the lower costs associated with arbitration hearing proce-
dures and the lower costs of fewer and selected judicial appeals. 286
5. Predictability
A rational, fair dispute resolution system involves predictable results, and
a private/public arbitration/judicial system provides that necessary level of
predictability. The law affords parties, arbitrators, and judges with the basis
for determining what the legal results ought to be. Precedent - what the law
has been and is - coupled with the availability of judges to apply and inter-
pret the applicable law - reviewability - make predictability predictable.
D. Meeting Private and Public Needs and Interests
Does this public/private system meet the public interest needs of our so-
cietal community? Does this arbitration/judicial system meet the private needs
of the parties involved in the dispute? We think so. This integrated public and
285. Re, supra note 275, 15 109-10.
286. See LEwis MALTBY. PRIvATE JUSTICE: EMPLOYMENT ARBrIRAToN AND CIVIL RIGHTS. IN
ARBITRATION Now 23 (ABA Section of Dispute Resolution eds. 1999); Roper Starch Worldwide,
Inc., Legal Dispute Study (Sept. 1999), available at <http'//www.arb-forum.com>in the Forum
library.
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private system substantially promotes good things and significantly eliminates
bad things:
A Rational, reasonable process... that eliminates excessive costs. Peo-
ple with disputes can choose to have them decided instead of compromised.
Disputants can rationally decide on economic reasons to bring a claim or as-
sert a defense and know they can have an expert arbitration and a reviewing
judge decide who is right or wrong. Parties no longer have to face or incur
excessive costs to have their day in private/public court.
An accessible, responsive system... that avoids excessive delays. Parties
can become involved in an available, understandable system. They have
prompt access to dispute resolution results. They do not have to wait years
and endure seemingly endless delays for justice.
An available, populist process ... that reduces excessive cases. Individ-
uals can bring and defend their own claims, can assert their rights, can seek
the relief for themselves. Large, cumbersome cases which substantially benefit
lawyers are no longer needed. Consumers, employees, and individuals can ob-
tain what they deserve, without having it substantially reduced by lawyer
fees, administrative costs, and distributions to many who do not care. Effec-
tive class actions which seek effective results for all can continue to be
brought in judicial forums by governmental, administrative, and regulatory
agencies with the assistance of private lawyers. Groups of parties can be also
be brought in arbitral forums by agreement of the parties. An evolutionary
public/private system can return to Americans a civil justice process for all,
and not just the monied or those who can afford or have access to lawyers.
Wise decision makers. . . who avoid unpredictable, improper decisions.
Parties to a dispute need to have faith and trust in their decision makers. Par-
ties expect - and demand - that decisions be based on the merits of a case,
and not on emotions, irrational ideas, or biases. Arbitrators and judges and ju-
rors can provide this procedures. Under existing law, jurors can determine
whether enforceable arbitration/judicial agreements exists.28 Arbitrators can
decide who is wins and who loses a case. Judges can decide whether the ju-
rors and arbitrators are legally correct. Not perfect, but a fair, affordable, and
accessible system for all.
287. 9 U.S.C. § 4.
55
Haydock and Henderson: Arbitration and Judicial Civil Justice: An American Historical Re
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2002
E. The Future Arbitration/Judicial Review Partnership
Can this integrated private/public civil justice system continue to fulfill
its promises? It can and will. In this system, private neutral experts and arbi-
trators join forces with judicial judges to provide a fair, affordable, and acces-
sible system. Arbitrators serve as de facto private magistrates to the public
judges who review their work.
A purely pubic system cannot meet the demands imposed by civil mone-
tary disputes between private parties. The trial of criminal cases by public
judges does and ought to take preference. The costs to the public to develop
and maintain a dispute system to resolve civil monetary disputes is well be-
yond the means of taxpayers. The private businesses that have or are iivolved
in these civil disputes can pay for access to a system for individuals they are
doing business with, including consumers, employees, and customers. The
federal, state, and local governments have much more critical needs to pro-
vide and pay for with limited governmental resources. Education, housing,
and medical care are among the more essential goods and services the gov-
ernment needs to male available to all Americans.
Those of us involved as professionals in dispute resolution forums need
to listen to and respond to the needs and interests of the public that does not
use such a system. Dispute resolution practitioners and commentators can eas-
ily come to the belief that a civil monetary dispute system is the most impor-
tant thing that a government needs to provide. For most Americans, it is not.
It is important and essential and vital to a prosperous and democratic
America and it must be monitored by public judges, as it has been and is.
But it need not be and is not exclusively a purely governmental function. The
answer lies with a private/public partnership.
ADR experts need to listen to judges, court administrators, and those
who review our judicial system. Public judges, no matter how hard they
work, always have had and will have caseloads that prevent them from
spending the time and attention necessary to try the hundreds of thousands of
civil disputes that occur. Private arbitrators can relieve public judges of this
excessive work and allow the public judges the time and energy to review,
when necessary, arbitration procedures and awards.
ADR professionals also need to listen as well to parties who have or
may have disputes. They deserve and desire a fair, affordable, accessible, and
responsive dispute resolution process. We should not provide them with ex-
pensive, lengthy, and complex processes and results. We have an opportunity
to continue to develop a nationwide private/public dispute resolution model
that meets the goals and objectives developed by the law and explained in
this article. We can all accomplish all this by working together and develop-
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ing an accessible and effective private/public civil justice system now and for
the future.
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